

LS: I'd like to cover today issues and some legislation in 1962, as well as some of the events of 1963.

I'd like to start with the Budget of 1962-63. It was reported as being a record budget of \$355 million, and one of the interesting things that the press picked up was that in 1962 there was a significant cut of \$6 million in the Highways budget. I'm interested in that specifically, but also, what were your Government's priorities in programming and budgeting during this period of time?

ECM: Perhaps I should comment first on the reduction in highway expenditures in that period. You have to remember that during the Depression years there was practically no highway construction carried on by the Province. There simply wasn't any money to do it. In fact, when our Government came into office in 1935 there was only about 25 miles of surfaced highway in the entire Province. The main highway between Calgary and Edmonton was just a gravel road, and there were thousands of miles of secondary roads (and some pretty main roads) that were not even gravelled.

So as quickly as we could get a little bit of money together, the first concentration as far as highways were concerned was not building new roads but gravelling the existing roads to make them what we called in those days "all-weather roads" so you could drive on them when it was wet as well as dry. And also we started a modest program of surfacing, the first objective being to get the Edmonton-Calgary highway surfaced within a reasonable length of time. It took quite a number of years.

I should also mention of course the intervention of the War years. That suspended practically all highway construction because there wasn't money, and what money there was was diverted to other things that were more closely related to the War effort.

So we had a great deal of catching up to do on road preparation and gravelling, and also the start on hard-surfacing the roads. So for a number of years the Highway Department was given a lot of priority in revenues, and we scrimped on some of the others to enable that work to go on.

When we reached this period in the 60's, it was felt that the highway system was well up to schedule. We had a tremendous lot of work still to do, but it was well advanced. So we started shifting money from the Highways department to some of the others, particularly education and public health which felt they'd been rather neglected with the money going to the highways. That was really the reason for the shift.

You could say at that point, as far as budget priorities were concerned, there was a shift away from the physical construction of roads to the social service area, particularly education and health.

LS: Why was that?

ECM: Well, the reason we'd concentrated on the highway end was that in a province which in those days was primarily rural (people were scattered all over the rural areas) transportation was vital to everything - farmers hauling their grain, people getting to and from town. Without a system of highways that people could use all the year round, everybody was not only inconvenienced but the economics of it were very bad, and the costs were great. So we had to give that a high priority. Once the basic requirements in that field were attended to, we moved to the field that more directly concerned people in the personal sense. And of course education and health were the top of list in those things.

LS: Another thing that I'd like to discuss briefly is that in the early 60's the Brasseau Dam project was going ahead. As I understand it, the Cabinet had power to invest money. What I'm not clear on is the relationship between Calgary Power's plans to build a dam and the Government involvement. Apparently your Government was charged with favouring this particular company. What was the issue there?

ECM: Well, there were two interests involved. The Government - apart altogether from power generation and Calgary Power - was faced with the necessity of building a control dam (which is what the original concept of the Brasseau Dam was) to control the flow in the North Saskatchewan River. This was because in the low water period the volume simply wasn't adequate to maintain the quality of the river. It was being used for the City of Edmonton and other cities downstream, and with the sewage disposal plants dumping treated effluent into the river you had to have a minimum year-round flow to maintain the quality of the water. Otherwise, you were in serious trouble. The flow in the North Saskatchewan fluctuated quite widely; it was high at the runoff season and went down to very little in the winter. So the original concept of the Brasseau was a storage dam to regulate that flow - let water out in the normally slack water period and contain it in the runoff period.

The Calgary Power Company had been exploring the various sites in the Province that had potential for hydroelectric development, and the Brasseau area was one that they had considered. So about the same time that the Province felt they had to move to put in this river flow control dam (because we were getting violent protests as far away as Prince Alberta, Saskatchewan, saying that Alberta was polluting the water in the river and wasn't controlling the flow of the water so that in periods of the year the water was polluted because the volume wasn't enough to handle the effluent being dumped into it), Calgary Power was seriously considering building a dam for hydroelectric generation purposes, as a company.

It seemed a very logical thing to us to see if it wasn't viable to combine the two things. And after a lot of negotiations, an agreement was worked out with Calgary Power whereby they shared in the costs of the dam, which was designed then not only for flood control (river control) but also for hydroelectric. In other words, the dam that we would have built would not be the one that they would have built, or vice-versa. But by modifications in the plan it could be built so it could serve both purposes. In our judgment, that was a very desirable thing to do. First of course because the economics were far better to serve the two purposes. It didn't cost much more to build a dam suitable for both than for one. It also meant

that Calgary Power picked up a large part of the cost of the dam which otherwise the Province would have had to pay 100% - had it been purely a river control dam. So we worked out an agreement with the company, and it was built and financed jointly by the Province and the company.

As far as the criticism of favoritism to Calgary Power, that was pretty ridiculous. It was a political criticism. It was ridiculous because Calgary Power was the major company in Alberta that was generating electricity, so of course they were looking all over the Province for sites where they could build hydroelectric dams. They were the one that you had to deal with; they were the one that was in the field, building hydroelectric projects. So it was logical that we would work out a deal with them to have a joint project instead of us paying the whole shot ourselves.

LS: And was the project consistent with Government policy in terms of relationships with private sector organization?

ECM: Oh yes. There was nothing that we saw as inconsistent with our policy. In that case it wasn't a matter of the Government going into the electric generation business, or Calgary Power going into a facility that was really for another purpose altogether. It was an opportunity to combine in one project two objectives. We certainly wouldn't have spent the money to build a dam for hydroelectric - that wasn't our concern, we weren't in the electric generation field. That was Calgary Power's concern. They weren't in the business of building dams to control the flow of water in the river. So because we had interests that could be combined we made a joint venture of it.

LS: I want to raise an issue that's a digression because I think it's a continuing one today, and that is the whole question of protecting the water resources. This leads into national considerations and in fact international considerations, because of the runoff from the Rockies through the Province. What are your opinions on that issue, especially in the criticism by Canadians again saying we should keep that kind of resource here and not have agreements with the States.

ECM: People have to recognize that water, while it's so commonplace that we don't think much about it, is one of the most valuable resources we have. All you have to do to realize that is look at the problems they face in areas where there's a shortage of water - the southwestern United States is a good example, where the States of California and Arizona and some of those States have fought each other over the waters in the Colorado River for years because it's absolutely vital that they have water. We have so much water here that people don't think very much about it. That's number one: the importance of the resource can't be stressed too much.

Number two, there is a lot of misunderstanding, or it might be more correct to say misinformation, about the status of the water resources as far as this part of the country is concerned. There are some Canadians (and this is part of the nationalistic attitude that's prevalent today) that would just shudder at the idea of Canada ever exporting water. I remember advocating years ago that Canada, certainly in the West, should take a hard look at exporting water, as being one of the things we could do that would help our national balance of payments very substantially, without doing ourselves any damage whatever. You see, water isn't like oil. Water is the most amazing resource in the way it works. The rivers run into the sea, the sun evaporates the water, the wind blows the clouds back over the land and dumps it back where it came from. As the old scriptural record says, All the rivers run into the sea, yet the sea is not full for the place from whence the waters came, thither they return again. It's perpetual - it goes on and on forever

In this part of Canada, what our people don't recognize is the millions of tons of water that flow into the Arctic and, as far as people are concerned, do absolutely no good to anybody. They just run into the Arctic Ocean, work out the levels of oceans around the world, and come back and do it all over again. It certainly would be viable, if Canada wanted to do it, to divert some of that water into an export market. Now, today it's such a costly thing, I don't know whether it would even be viable. It would have been in the earlier days.

But it's not like the western and southern part of the States where every bit of their water is used. States are fighting for it - there isn't enough of it. But here, all the northern part of this country, especially in the West, has these millions and millions of tons of water run into the Mackenzie Basin, for example, and into the Arctic Ocean, and there's no use of it. There's nobody there to use it. The diversion of some of that water would not adversely affect anybody.

I know today the ecologists say you can't take a pail of water out of the Mackenzie River without upsetting the sensitive environment of the Arctic. I don't believe that myself. But we do have in Western Canada far more water than we can use, particularly as far as the water going to the Arctic.

That's not true of the waters in the southern part, and southern Alberta has been worried about water. Southern Saskatchewan is worried about water. I remember we set up years ago a joint committee between Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta to be an advisory body on the regulation of the flow of water through the Saskatchewan River basin. Manitoba and Saskatchewan were quite concerned because they felt we were taking out too much water for irrigation in southern Alberta and that was lessening the flow of water that they would have for their purposes. And this was valid. Any province upstream has to recognize that they have a responsibility to the areas downstream, because this water crosses provincial boundaries. So there was an advisory committee set up to agree on a proportion of the flow that any one Province would use, for irrigation particularly.

LS: Was that a continuing thing?

ECM: As far as I know, I think they still have a committee. It may be in a different form today. There is a regulatory body. They were only advisory; the Provinces and their Governments in the last analysis decided the use they made of the water.

I might also mention (and we have talked about this before), this matter of continuous water supply was one of the reasons behind setting up the East Slope Conservation Board which was a joint board between Alberta and the Federal Government to preserve the forest coverage on the east slope of the Rockies. The concern there was that if that east slope was not protected and it was denuded of trees, then you would get the very heavy runoff in the spring (with the heavy snows on the east slope) which would cause a lot of erosion problems. And later on you'd have a serious shortage. As long as you keep a proper coverage, you slow down the rate at which the snows melt and come out, and you spread it over a longer period. And that was one of the main reasons for that body being set up.

LS: One final question on that whole issue. What is your opinion of the political climate in terms of the handling of that resource?

ECM: Well, I think today the nationalistic sentiment has been generated in Canada by what I call the "negative nationalists". I don't think a national government in this country today could approve the export of water. It wouldn't be a logical condemnation, but it would be an emotional condemnation.

LS: Returning to 1962, then, Ernest Watkins (a PC Member from Calgary) introduced a Public Bill in that year having to do with the Bill of Rights. First of all, I'm interested in the whole issue of an individual introducing a Public Bill, and secondly I'm interested in your opinion about that kind of thing - a Bill of Rights - in legislation.

ECM: First of all on the matter of a Public Bill. There are three common types of bills that are introduced into Legislatures or Parliament. One category is Government Bills which are introduced by Ministers of the Crown, which are normally the legislation which expresses Government policy. Then there are Private Bills which can be introduced by any private Member on either side of the House, and they usually deal with issues of concern to some community or some particular issue in which that Member is particularly interested. They're not of broad public interest in the sense that a

Government Bill is Government policy. Then Public Bills, as they're called (which are very rarely used) are bills which do deal with a basic public concern or public issue. They're not just something from a little group or some region, but they have a broad public application. They're rarely used because actually it's so easy to divide legislation into just the two categories, Government Bills and Private Bills, and usually Members of the Opposition, if they're introducing a bill, just bring in an ordinary Private Bill.

A Public Bill, as I say, focuses attention on the fact that the subject matter is supposed to be of broad public interest and concern and not something that just would interest a little group. In this case, Mr. Watkins, who was a private Member of the Opposition, brought in that bill as a Public Bill.

The other thing (and this is rather a detail) is that the treatment of these on the Order Paper of parliaments and legislatures differs. There's a day set aside for Private Bills, and what they usually do there is debate them. They're usually talked out and then the one drops to the bottom of the list and they take the next one. A Public Bill has a higher priority than a Private Bill in the order of agenda. A few little things like that make a difference.

So Mr. Watkins brought in this "Bill of Rights" as a Public Bill. I don't recall now the actual provisions of the Bill of Rights. As far as I do remember it, I think it was pretty much the normal type of a bill of rights. I think Mr. Watkins brought it in probably for two reasons. First, he was very interested in that field. He was a lawyer from the Old Country (British background) and he attached a lot of concern and importance to human rights. I think he was genuinely interested in it. Number two, it undoubtedly had a political publicity aspect because it was something that would be played up in the press and would get some publicity for the Member and his party and so on.

You asked about my attitude toward Bills of Rights. I think I've said previously in our talks, I have never been impressed with the concept of

trying to spell out rights in legislation. I guess I'm of the old school. I've always shared the view that I think Winston Churchill expressed better than anybody I can recall. One time when he was being pressed in the British Parliament to bring in a Bill of Rights, the old gentleman, in his righteous indignation said something to the effect that "if the Honourable Member suggests that the rights enjoyed by citizens under the British flag are so limited that they can ever be spelled out in a piece of legislation...". To him it was abhorrent. Under the British flag you enjoyed all rights, and you didn't try to circumscribe them by spelling out a dozen or so of them in a piece of legislation.

My reasons for not attaching any great value to these written bills of rights is first of all, I don't like the basic philosophy that underlies most of them. The fundamental difference between a bill of rights and the British traditional system is that the bill of rights implies (and I don't say this is in the minds of a lot of the sponsors - I don't think they even think about it, but it is there) that rights basically reside in the State, and the State in its grace and goodness decides, "We will say to the people, these are your rights. We are by legislation assigning to you certain rights." It indirectly at least suggests that the source of these rights is the State, and the State by statute is very graciously conferring on you the right of free speech, the right of assembly, the right of religious freedom, and all these other things.

The British concept is that rights are inalienable and reside in individuals because they are people. The Americans adopted this concept when they said we are born equal and every man is endowed by his Creator with inalienable rights. In other words, he didn't get them from the States; he possesses them because he's a human being. That people have rights because they are human beings. That's the British tradition of human rights. The only rights, under that philosophy, that the citizen doesn't have, are those that the State has taken away from him. It's exactly the reverse of the other.

Under the bill of rights concept, the only ones he possesses are those the State tells him he possesses, and spells out in a Bill for him. Under the

British traditional concept, he possessed all rights except those which he voluntarily turned over to the State. That's my philosophy, and that's one reason why I'm not enthused about bills of rights.

The other reason is that I have read many bills of rights, and I have yet to see a bill of rights which in practice was able to guarantee what it purported to guarantee. There's always a way to get around rights. You have protection of rights in the field of discrimination. You say you can't discriminate against this person because of his colour. So whatever the issue is - it may be accommodation, it may be any one of a dozen things - the fellow says, "I don't discriminate against him because of his colour, but he's not able to pay the price I want." Or it's some other reason. That isn't why he's turning him down; he's turning him down because of a racial bias perhaps, but on the surface... it creates a lot of hypocrites. That's another thing I don't like about it; I don't like legislation that makes people hypocritical.

LS: I'd like to move on. There was some discussion in 1962, and apparently a committee set up, to study the legislation that covered sexual sterilization of some mental patients in provincial institutions. As an Albertan, it seems to me that this has been an ongoing contentious issue here for many years. I'm wondering what your opinion is on the issue, and any comments you may have on it.

ECM: This relates back to legislation that was passed in Alberta by the Farmers' Government way back in the 20's, or it may have been early 30's - before we came into office. Under it there was provision where serious cases of mental retardation could be sterilized after review by a medical panel that determined that the circumstances were such that this was desirable. That legislation was retained all through our regime; I think it's been repealed since, I believe by the present Government.

I always felt that it was appropriate legislation. The criticism of it was usually by those that didn't recognize what the legislation provided and how it operated. This wasn't an indiscriminate sterilization of people

just because they were mentally handicapped. There was provision for a panel of medical specialists who examined the individual case, and if the circumstances were such that this seemed to be desirable they had the authority to authorize the sterilization. It's a contentious issue because there are some that say it's wrong, period. No matter what the circumstances are. On the other hand, there are those who press (and we were pressed a number of times) to broaden this considerably. You have such widely differing opinions on an issue of that kind. It's dangerous to pick out isolated cases, but I can recall cases being brought to us of people who had reproduced in a chain of situations which were just tragic - which would have been prevented had this thing applied. On the other hand, somebody could say, Yes, but who knows? Somebody might have been sterilized who shouldn't have been, who produced a genius. So that's the other side of it.

It was contentious; it always was. It was very carefully administered. The panel of medical experts erred on the side of caution. The number was not anything like as extensive as it could have been. We felt on balance that it was in the public interest, but I admit quite frankly there were those who felt exactly the opposite.

LS: One of the criticisms about it has always been that in fact you were infringing on the rights of the individual.

ECM: That's valid to a degree. It's one of those gray areas. You're talking here, in the cases to which this applied, of people who were utterly incapable of making the decision for themselves, which I think puts that in a little different perspective. When somebody has even a very limited capacity to make a decision for themselves, certainly the state nor anyone else should interfere and take that power away from them. But you've got these tragic cases of people that are sometimes little more than vegetables, who have no capacity to make a decision. And how far you can still argue that they should have the right to function as what we would refer to as a normal human being, when tragically they were not normal human beings....

LS: I think the final interesting point is the whole question of what role the government takes in something that's obviously highly emotional and very controversial.

ECM: Well, I guess history would teach us that the government position on things like that changes with the change in public attitude. It's not a thing where you can arbitrarily say, "This is the appropriate solution, period." And there's no argument about it. The attitude of society in that period of time was very much in support of this. There was a great deal of concern about some of these tragic cases that I referred to. Today I would say it's not; I don't think you could pass that kind of legislation today. The emphasis in the last twenty years on the so-called human rights aspect has completely obliterated the concern for this type of person that I'm talking about. They say, Well, they're called human, so they're the same as the genius as far as these things are concerned. There's no distinction. That's a modern concept; who knows, fifty years from now it'll probably be entirely different again.

It was legislation which in its time was regarded by, I think, a very substantial number of people as desirable and beneficial all round. Today it would not be so.

LS: In the period 1961-62, your Government apparently put together a committee on oil and gas law revision. It was made up of Government representatives, other people, for instance, from the Canadian Petroleum Association, W. D. C. Mackenzie, J. Pratt. Also from the Independent Petroleum Association, A. Bailey. I'm interested in the terms of reference for this particular committee, but also in the larger question of why your Government was in fact looking at oil and gas law revision.

ECM: The oil and gas business, from 1947 on in Alberta, of course was a rapidly growing industry, moving from oil to gas and then the tar sands. There was constant change: new development, new fields, new problems in handling different categories of products, pipelining, all the other things. And as

a result, the legislation and regulations governing oil and gas development was under constant review to keep it abreast of the developing industry.

That's why you've noticed in what we've been looking at in legislation over those periods, the number of revisions and re-writing of statutes like the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. It was re-written three or four times, apart altogether from amendments that were made, to keep it abreast of the developing industry and the changing times.

As a matter of policy, in the Government, we always sought the input of those who were actually in the oil industry, because they were the ones who were living with the legislation and regulations, and we wanted to cash in on their experience, not only here but elsewhere. So it was a practice that we followed right from the time of 1947 when the Leduc field came in - not making any significant changes in that legislation without giving people in the industry an opportunity to have all the input they were prepared to make in it.

This committee you refer to was set up for that purpose. It was a representative committee of the major companies which was the Canadian Petroleum Association and the Independent Petroleum Association (which was the smaller Canadian companies). Mr. Pratt that you mentioned was a geologist. These men were all knowledgeable men in the field. They had no power - they were advisory. They'd sit down and go over all the legislation and point out, "Now here's a section which isn't working out very well," or "Here's something that could be improved. Here's a situation that's arisen that was not anticipated when this provision was put into the act. It should be broadened to cover it." That type of thing.

As a result, when we came to redrafting the legislation, we had all that input from the committee to work with.

LS: One question about that approach to updating and revising the laws. Was your Government unique in including people like this? And was your

Government not criticized for using people like this on advisory committees?

ECM: I think you could say yes to both of those questions. It was unique in that we did much more of that than is ordinarily done by governments. All governments do it to some extent. We were criticized, yes. I was never troubled by that kind of criticism, because we took the position (and I think it was very honest and realistic) that because a man or woman is elected to the Legislature, that doesn't automatically make them an expert in the petroleum and gas industry or any other industry - which is a common mistake that a lot of political people make. They suddenly become overnight experts once they're appointed to a Cabinet post or elected to government.

Our philosophy was, we're here to protect the public interest in the broad, general sense. When it comes to the nitty-gritty and the specifics of any area of activity whether it's agriculture, oil, gas, or manufacturing, we're not experts in that field. We want to get the input of the people who've spent their lives in that field, who forget more about it every night than we know.

That doesn't mean just because you ask their advice that you accept everything they say. You take what they say would be the desirable thing from the standpoint of making that industry the most efficient, and you say, "Now, as against that industry efficiency, what do we have to add to this, or what do we have to take away from this, or what additional aspects do we have to impose on this to protect the overall broad public interest?" That's where the Government came in, and that's where we considered ourselves the experts. We wouldn't ask the industry what you had to do to protect the public interest - that was our responsibility. But if we're talking about how fast you can produce an oil well to get the maximum ultimate recovery, I wouldn't ask the man on the street that. He'd have no way of knowing. But if you can get a good petroleum engineer, he'll tell you. That was the philosophy.

LS: I don't think that's always understood.

ECM: Oh, no, it isn't understood, and it's a hard thing to explain to the public. You've always got those who, if you even as much as talk to a man in the oil business, say, "Oh, you're being influenced by Imperial Oil" or something of this kind. Of course that's just utter nonsense to anybody that knows how it's done.

LS: The development at this time of the Great Canadian Oil Sands - at what point was it in its development? Apparently also your Government was criticized for not protecting Canadian interests. And what I'd like to do is read into the record a telegram that you sent on December 5th, 1962, to Thomas Clark, Managing Director for Great Canadian Oil Sands, and then get your comments on the whole thing.

The telegram read as follows: "For your guidance in preparing your plans for the development of the Athabasca oil sands, the Government of Alberta must insist that within reasonable cost margins Canadian contractors and suppliers of equipment and local workmen be given first priority. It must be recognized that the natural resource to be developed is owned by the people of Alberta collectively, who therefore rightfully expect this reasonable consideration to be given Canadian firms and workmen. Signed: Ernest C. Manning, Premier of Alberta."

Where was Great Canadian Oil Sands at this point in time, and what about the background and issue involved in that kind of telegram?

ECM: Great Canadian Oil Sands went through a long period of trying to raise finances to get into the production of tar sands. It was a very difficult thing; it required a lot of capital. It doesn't seem very much by today's standards. I think that ultimate plant cost probably in the neighborhood of a little over \$300 million, which is chicken feed when you talk about \$12 billion plants today, but it was a lot of money then. They tried very hard to raise capital for the project in Canada, but they were not successful. It was a high-risk project, and everybody realized that. The economic viability of it was questioned. We had had the Blair study years before this which had come out with the conclusion that it was economically viable to extract oil from the sands, and given adequate market and

reasonable prices it could be financial viable. But it wasn't a proven thing; there was nothing to go by; there was no plant of this kind in existence. So they tried and tried to interest various Canadian groups and companies in financing it.

At the time of this particular wire that you refer to, I don't know just what their status was. I think that was just about the time when they had reached the stage where they were going to have to get outside capital, and of course the Sun Oil company came in and made a deal with them and financed the thing ultimately. So it was financed primarily by outside capital. We did insist when they put the final financing deal together that they make an issue of convertible debentures to the people of Alberta, which they did. They didn't want to; they didn't need the money. Sun Oil had the money themselves. But we required that as a condition of the permit, to give Alberta people a stake in the project. I've forgotten the volume, but they issued some millions of dollars of convertible debentures. These debentures were guaranteed by the Sun Oil company. If I remember correctly, they carried interest at 6% and they were convertible into common stock of the company.

On this matter of the telegram: they were moving to the place where hopefully they were going to get the project into actual construction, and we had made this clear to them, but I simply put on record in this wire to them that the position of the Province was that they would have to give appropriate recognition to Canadian contractors and Canadian workmen in the construction of the plant. One reason we wanted to make this clear was that they were moving (and I don't remember at what stage they were with this) to the position where it seemed quite obvious that they were going to have to finance this by outside capital - in other words, the Sun Oil company coming in - and we wanted to make sure that this wasn't going to result in bringing in all U.S. contractors and workmen from other places, and passing over Alberta contractors and workmen. So we simply put that on record to them, that they would be expected (assuming that the costs would be relatively the same) to give priority to Canadian workmen. You'll notice in that wire, we didn't stress Alberta workmen - we were a little more nationalist in those days than some Albertans are today in Government.

LS: The Great Canadian Oil Sands projects, though, it seems to me, has been one of the most criticized in the sense of just that issue - the protection of Canadian and Alberta interests. What are your comments on that?

ECM: Well, I go back to the history of the thing. The people of Alberta, the people of Canada, the companies in Canada, the investment houses in Canada, the financial sources in Canada, had a number of years in which they were almost begged to put up the money to do this. And the only reason that the Sun Oil Company got into the act was that Great Canadian Oil Sands was not able to raise this capital in Canada. I think Canadians have to recognize that.

I'm not criticizing them for not investing their money in it. It was a highly speculative venture. But I think when they would not take the opportunity to finance it in Canada, they certainly shouldn't criticize the company for saying, "Okay, if you feel you don't want to take the risk, here's a company down in the United States that's prepared to take it; we'll make a deal with them." That's how it came about.

It wasn't as if they'd gone to the U.S. company to do this job, or started that way. It started in this country. And as I say, there was a period of four or five years when they did everything they could to raise the money in Canada. But Canadians wouldn't invest in it.

LS: It's interesting, too, that you say the company wasn't particularly keen to have these debentures, but your Government insisted upon them. Were there other points of disagreement between Great Canadian Oil Sands and your Government's policy?

ECM: I don't know whether I'd use the word disagreement, certainly not in its broad sense. All of these large projects involve a great deal of negotiation between the governments and the companies that are doing them. They had to obtain a permit from the Province to go ahead with the project, had to obtain leases from the Province. Where the discussions and debates came in was in the terms and conditions of those leases and permits. One

of the conditions that I mentioned - that we insisted on - was that they make an issue of convertible debentures to the people of Alberta. They said, "We don't need money from the people of Alberta; we've got money of our own." We said, "That's fine, but we want this in because we want the people of Alberta to have an opportunity to get an equity in it." Their response would be, "Well, they had that opportunity for five years and didn't take it; now you're going to force them to have an equity in it, whether they want it or not." We said, "Well, you could interpret it that way, but once the project's going ahead we think the people of Alberta, the small investors, will go into it."

And they did. Incidentally, I don't remember the amount of the debenture issue that was required - it wasn't large - but it was over-subscribed, three times over. They had to have a computer selection of the people that finally got the debentures because so many applied for them.

I've said before, I think I heard from practically all the ones that didn't get debentures; I never heard from any of the ones that did! But I used to get all kinds of letters from people furious because they had applied for \$10,000 worth of debentures and only been given \$1,000 worth - they had prorated the stuff.

But there were a lot of other conditions. There was a long-drawn-out debate on the question of royalties on the tar sand oil. There was a question raised, and I remember quite an extensive debate, over whether in that kind of an operation the royalties should be on the oil-impregnated sand, as a mining operation, rather than on the finished product (the oil that was taken out of the sand.) These were the kinds of issues. What were the rates of the royalties going to be?

The other very contentious issue of that time, not only between them and the Government but between them and the conventional industry, was, what share of the market were they going to get? In those days there was a surplus of oil, and there wasn't a market for the oil that was already being produced from the oil wells, and the wells were being pro-rated to

market - some of them operating at less than 50% of capacity. So the industry was very much opposed to the tar sand development at that stage, because they knew that you couldn't pro-rate that oil to market. It was a mining operation, and had to run continuously. So they knew if the oil sand was permitted to enter the petroleum market, the only way it could get there would be to cut back on the amount of oil that could be sold from that produced from the conventional wells. So they were very exercised about it.

All these things had to be thrashed out, and many of them included in the permits or terms of the leases.

LS: I'd like to move and look at some of the specific legislation of 1962.

The first piece is Chapter 59, which had to do in fact with oil and gas conservation. What were the provisions there?

ECM: That was simply an amendment. As I mentioned earlier, in handling the Oil and Gas Conservation Act there were two methods used. Almost every session there would be some amendments to the Act because of situations that had developed during the year with the growth of the industry; and then every two or three years we would re-write the Act altogether. 1962 happened to be a year when all they did was make a few amendments to the Act.

Actually, there's nothing too basic in that. It spelled out new provisions for the use of natural gas. As I recall, it gave the Province power to prohibit gas being used for certain purposes. This was in line with our conservation program; we had vast quantities of coal that we were concerned about, and with the popularity of gas (which was going up very rapidly in those days) the tendency was to use gas for everything. We didn't want to see gas used in power generation if there was coal available; we didn't want to see it used for industrial furnaces if there was coal available, because it was a premium fuel. And this legislation was broadened to give greater control over that type of thing.

It also made provision that the Government could declare a plant a "common processor". We've talked before about "common carriers" for pipelines; this now was extended to processing plants, where a company that had a processing plant could be required to act as a common processor and process gas for all the producers in a field instead of just their own. These were the types of amendments that were included.

LS: Like a streamlining?

ECM: Yes, well, updating to meet the requirements of changing conditions.

LS: The second piece of legislation, Chapter 84, An Act Respecting Soil Conservation. I'm interested in the provisions, but I also have a question. Apparently it allowed municipalities to assume control of a farm for 3-5 years to effect conservation measures, and I'm interested in your comments on that as well as the other provisions.

ECM: This was purely a conservation measure, and it related to soil - particularly farm land. It empowered municipalities to appoint what were called Conservation Officers. Their responsibility was to examine any cases that came to their attention where farming methods that were being used, or complete neglect of the soil, was resulting in erosion or serious detrimental effects to the soil. It extended so far that if a farmer was employing soil practices - that is, the manner in which he was handling the soil - that were obviously causing the soil to deteriorate or erode....

The few who had no respect for soil and wanted to be able to destroy it if they wished of course opposed it, but generally as far as the public was concerned it was accepted.

LS: And the rural population could see the overall....

ECM: Oh yes, the rural people on the whole are pretty dedicated to the soil. Many of the people who give rise to some of these problems are not the

traditional farmer, who loves the soil. They are usually these weekend farmers who haven't the same interest in the preservation of the value and quality of soil.

LS: That's an interesting thing too now - a current thing - with the whole question of annexation around this city. A lot of that is good farmland.

ECM: A very real concern (not only here, but all over Canada - and to my mind it should be a much bigger concern than it is) is the tremendous amount of prime farm land that has been taken out of production, either to bury it under concrete or asphalt, or turn it into an industrial site. I know you have to have these things, and I'm all for having them. But in so many cases - and it's true in the location of industrial sites - very often these things could be located in areas where the quality of soil is poor, and really you don't lose too much. Airports are another thing which are tremendous wasters of soil.

But there seems to be so little attention paid to that. They'll go and plant a huge airport in the middle of some of the most productive soil in the country, and cover that valuable soil with 18 inches of concrete and gravel and think that's progress. That kind of thing is stupid, in my judgment.

LS: Another piece of legislation in 1962 was Chapter 60, with the interesting title of Petty Trespass to Land. What was that all about?

ECM: Well, it was a rather minor piece of legislation, but it was trying to deal with a very controversial and irritating problem - mainly hunting on farm land. Farmers were at perpetual war, I suppose you could say, for years, with hunters, particularly in the fall with the duck season and so on. It isn't that the average hunter minds people hunting on his land, but he gets very irritated when they leave the gates open and let his cattle out, and drive through his grain fields, and throw beer bottles all over the place, and all this kind of stuff. What this provided for was that a man who

didn't want people on his land could post the land, and if the land was posted and somebody went on it, then they could be charged under this Trespass Act and fined for doing it.

LS: Another piece of legislation, Chapter 72, An Act Respecting Public Service. I'm interested in the provisions, but also at this point in time you start to hear a lot about the inequities of salaries between public service and the private sector. Apparently the Chief Commissioner of your Government was very concerned about this. It seems to be an ongoing kind of issue. First of all, what were the provisions?

ECM: It was a new act altogether. It repealed the former Public Service Act and what was called the Public Service Commissioners Act, and all of the powers were embodied in this Act. It was an update of all the legislation and procedures that related to the establishment and structures of government departments and the public service in general - employment, the methods of hiring, the procedures in classifying employees, and all that kind of thing. It provided for appointment of a Commissioner. One of the things that it provided for was the classification of all positions in the Public Service. Then there was a provision for an Appeal Board so that if somebody disagreed with those classifications there was a mechanism for having the classifications reviewed.

One of the significant things in it was that it provided for the establishment of a general pay schedule. This went hand-in-hand with the classification. In other words, all the positions were classified under different categories, and there was a general pay schedule. These had a starting salary and then increments going over maybe four or five years. And the general concept behind this legislation as far as remuneration was concerned was that the employee was entitled to an annual increment, unless there was some reason why they should not have it.

It was quite an advance on the more or less haphazard method that applied before, where the senior departmental people said, "Well, John Jones has

done a good job, he's entitled to a raise, and Bill Smith hasn't, he doesn't get a raise," and that type of thing.

It also provided for a Joint Council which consisted of six people: three Cabinet Ministers (one of whom was Chairman) and three members appointed by the Public Service Association. That Joint Council, incidentally, had been in operation before. This confirmed it in legislation, and streamlined it a bit. It was a very effective system. I remember chairing that for many years, and we had excellent relations with the public service in those days. Any problem that arose, we'd take to Joint Council and thrash it out, and nine times out of ten it ended there - was resolved there.

LS: There was a different climate in those days?

ECM: Oh yes, there was a far more cooperative atmosphere in those days.

On the matter of salaries that you mentioned, the public service pay was significantly under the private sector in those days. We have the reverse today; in many cases now the public service has gone past the private sector. Personally I think that was a mistake. I know this again sounds oldfashioned, but I have always felt - whether it's the elected people or people who are hired to do specific jobs - that public service should always carry with it a little bit of that title, in other words, it should be a service. It's not the field for people for whom "How much can I get out of it?" is the only interest in being in it, which has become all too common today.

The other thing that was recognized then much more than it is now (I think perhaps because these things meant more to people in those days) is that one of the great benefits of public service, and the reason why so many people were very anxious to make a career of the public service (what they call "career public servants") was not that the pay was good - the pay was usually less than what you could make in the private sector - but there was a security of tenure. It was a life job. And it was in relatively pleasant operating conditions to what you found in many industries. There

weren't the pressures of many office jobs. And things of this kind. There was a far greater recognition in those days that those were compensations that offset the somewhat lower salary schedule.

Today that attitude has largely dissipated. I don't think there are too many people today who look on anything as a life career. The idea is to have half-a-dozen careers. So if you can get a couple of years in the public service and then go on to something else, too often the attitude is, "Let's strike for the maximum we can get for the two years here, and then we can go on and do something else." Well, that wasn't the attitude at all in those days.

LS: To what do you attribute that change of climate in the relationship between the government today and public servants (AUPE and various organizations like that)?

ECM: I don't think you can put your finger on one thing and say it's due to one particular situation. I think it's a combination of things.

One is the general change in public attitude. What I said a moment ago about the tendency, for example, for people to move from one field of work to another, is a general condition today. In the old days (not just in government), people got onto the payroll of a company, and they probably started at the bottom and spent thirty years there, and were happy to do it. That's what they wanted to do. Today, no. They're bored in a few years and want to go somewhere else.

Whether that's good or bad, it has a tremendously disrupting effect on relationships. If you come into a company or a civil service with the idea that "this is going to be my life's work", you want to build relationships. It's almost like a family aspect. Your attitude's altogether different than if you're utterly indifferent to what the future is. It's a job, the pay's pretty good, and I have this income while I look around for something better - the attitude is altogether different. And you have so much of that today.

That's one thing. Number two - and this is getting off into another field but is a cause of a lot of this - is the general deterioration of the whole system of moral values has a bearing on this. In the old days (and I know this sounds antiquated), people - employees as well as employers - attached a great deal of importance that you gave an honest day's work for an honest day's pay. And that meant something. I don't think it means a lot today.

It's tragic. There can be all kinds of people who wouldn't think of stealing \$5.00 out of the petty cash box, but they don't think anything of stealing \$5.00 worth of time on the job - loafing or sitting around visiting or something when they're supposed to be working. There's no difference; they're stealing time which is worth \$5.00, or whatever it is. The moral attitude in the earlier days restrained people from doing that; they didn't do it because it was their own moral conviction that it was wrong to do it. Today you don't have that restraint, so that's all gone.

As far as the situation referred to, it prevails in the public service today certainly in Alberta. It seems to be very bad. It seems to be a confrontation situation all the time. I don't say this to involve personalities, but my own honest opinion of it is that the leadership of the public service organizations today is not in the same bracket at all as it was in those earlier days. They had some excellent men. I can remember the men that used to be presidents of the Civil Service Association and used to represent the Association on the Joint Council. Their whole attitude was - they regarded themselves as partners with the elected people in giving the people of the Province the best possible government. That was their concern.

Today it seems to be, "How much more can I get? how much more holiday with pay?" It's all confrontation. And leadership means so much in these things. If you get poor leadership.... To my mind, it's one of the sad things about our whole union structure today. Too often, the people who get themselves elected to leadership positions in labour organizations are aggressive, radical types - soap-boxers - who make a big noise and hold themselves up to be the great champions. As a result, you don't get the

people of calibre, character, and responsibility that you should have in those positions.

Those are the changes that I see taking place over the years.

LS: One final piece of legislation in 1962 was Chapter 49, having to do with Mines and Minerals.

ECM: This again was a new act. The Mines and Minerals Act was something like the Oil and Gas Conservation Act. It was amended almost every session, and re-written completely every few years, and this was a complete re-write so it was a big Act. It didn't introduce too much that was new. It did include the tar sands which had not been in the old legislation, because they were coming into the picture now.

Perhaps you've noticed it was divided into nine parts. The first one dealt with administration. Part Two dealt with the coal industry. Part Three with quarryable minerals. Part Four with minerals and road allowances - that sounds like rather a minor thing, but you see the road allowances belong to the Crown and the simplest thing was to lease the mineral rights on the road allowance to people who owned the mineral rights on the adjacent land because they were dealing underground, and this kind of thing. Petroleum and natural gas was the fifth Part; Part Six was bitumenous sands; Part Seven was registration and transfer of documents; Part Eight dealt with the unit operation of minerals; and Part Nine with geophysical exploration.

There was nothing specifically new or new in principle, but updating all the legislation in those areas.

LS: One of the new things that I think was introduced by that piece of legislation was that there was a reduction of petroleum leases from 21 years to 10 years. Why was that?

ECM: That was because the petroleum leases spell out the conditions of development. In the early years, 21 years was, I think, really a carryover from land leases. That was a common term there. We came to the conclusion that 21 years was too long to commit the Province to saying, "We won't change the conditions of development." As a result, they were cut down to ten.

This was a very important thing because it's one of the areas of so much misunderstanding on the part of the people - the ownership of mineral rights and the protection of the rights of the people of the Province. It's so important in this Province (and it's unique in Canada in this respect) that people do know and understand that it was never the practice of our government, it was not the practice of the Farmers' Government before us, and it has not been the practice of the present Government, to dispose of the titles of mineral rights to anybody. In other words, the title which is the certificate of ownership remains with the Crown. That's been the practice in Alberta going back to the 1920's.

All development took place (and the bulk of it still takes place) in the private sector, but it takes place only under lease agreements. All these companies have, whether it's a multinational company or an Alberta company, is a lease on some mineral rights. The ownership remains with the Crown, with the people of the Province. And the lease spells out the terms and conditions of development - the royalties they have to pay, how they have to develop it, where they have to develop it, and all the details.

The important thing for the people of the Province to know is, as long as you're developing under leases, the owner dictates the terms of the leases. And you exercise complete control as long as you adhere to that system instead of alienating the ownership rights. Once you give the ownership to somebody else, there's not too much you can do about it. You can't interfere with something that somebody else owns. But that's a different ball of wax altogether than maintaining the ownership yourself and saying, "You can develop it, provided you do it in this way, and you pay this and this, and you don't do this, and you do do that," and so on.

And really, when you follow that system it doesn't make much difference whether it's developed by an individual, by a local company, by a multi-national company... it's the terms of the lease that are important. And that's what's so often overlooked.

You hear the socialist crowd particularly screaming about "foreign ownership of oil" in Alberta. They don't own a bit of oil in Alberta; they own the product that they've produced, but the titles are in the hands of the people of Alberta. All these companies have are leases to develop.

LS: I think we do lose sight of that.

ECM: Oh, they do lose sight of it. As I say, what we did in this particular case was drop the term of those leases from 21 years to 10, which meant that you had a far greater flexibility in changing the conditions of the leases. It would be a very serious thing - though it has been done - for the Government to change the terms of a lease arbitrarily, while the lease is in effect. After all, you destroy all confidence in the terms if you do that. So our position as a Government was, "When you get a lease, whatever the terms are there, those are the terms for the ten years. At the end of the ten years we'll be taking a look at it, and next time the terms may be quite different. But you know as long as you have the lease that we're not going to change the rules in the middle of the game."

That's one of the things that the Federal Government has been doing recently, and of course it's driving capital out of this country by the hundreds of millions of dollars. It's a pretty serious things to entice a company - whether it's a Canadian company or a foreign company - to come into an area, to spend hundreds of millions of dollars in development under a lease with certain terms, and then in the middle of it you change the terms and say, "Sorry, but from here on out it's going to be different." That kind of thing, as far as being able to attract developers and investment capital, is absolutely disastrous. It's one of the things we're suffering from in Canada today.

LS: I'd like to move on and talk about some issues in 1963. One of the things of significance to all Canadians that received a lot of press notice was the 1963 federal election when Diefenbaker was defeated. I have a number of questions: (1) What, in your opinion, caused the defeat of his government? and (2) I'd like to read you a quote from the Edmonton Journal of February 9th, 1963 which was in fact the headline for that day, "Manning Blamed for Tory Government's Fall", and get your comments on that. Apparently that had to do with something that Mr. Thompson did in Ottawa in terms of bringing in a no-confidence motion, and having a dinner meeting with you.

So first of all, what caused the defeat, in your opinion?

ECM: Well, the Diefenbaker Government was disintegrating from within. It had been disintegrating for quite a while before the defeat in the House. There was schism within the Government itself; the Ministers felt that Diefenbaker had lost control of Parliament and the Government; there was conniving going on among them about how to replace him with somebody else; and all this kind of thing.

LS: Was that generally known?

ECM: It was well-known around Ottawa. They didn't know precisely what was going on, except that there was a lot going on. I think it reached a stage where he just lost control over the Party and Parliament.

LS: How did that happen?

ECM: Well, I don't know again what particularly thing you could put your finger on. Diefenbaker, you know, was a remarkable Canadian, and he has - and rightly so - a great deal of respect in Canada as a great Canadian. He was first, last, and always for Canada, and a lot of people admire him. I don't think it can be said that Diefenbaker was a great administrator in any way, shape or form, and I don't think he was a good administrator; I don't think he was a good Prime Minister from that standpoint. For one

thing, I think he wanted to channel everything through himself. I don't think his Ministers had the latitude that a Minister must have to be efficient in administering a department.

I know we used to find problems in the Provincial Government. If you wanted a decision, and it was something you'd referred to a department, you'd find, "That was sent over to the Prime Minister's office; he wanted to take a look at it." That kind of thing. Now you can't operate a country that way; it's too big a job. You've got to be able to delegate and trust your Ministers.

I think probably this type of thing also created some feelings on the part of his Ministers that they were put in an awkward position. But there was a general deterioration of the administration. It was just out of control. He didn't seem to have the capacity to handle it. So the situation was worsening. He was in a minority position in the House at that time, and it's bad enough to have internal dissension of that kind when you have a good majority - you can weather that storm as a rule because if you do have a few people of your own that turn against you, well, so what? you've got enough bodies that it's not serious. But he didn't have that. He was dependent not only on his own people, he was dependent on the small parties in the Opposition, otherwise he was defeated.

Now this nonsense about me being responsible for his defeat, that's been written up and was bandied around Ottawa. I've forgotten how many Members Social Credit group had, but it was a relatively small group; but because of the minority position of the Government they exercised a lot of power. They had almost a balance of power position.

I happened to be in Ottawa on some government business - it was nothing whatever to do with defeating Diefenbaker. While there, I did have dinner with Bob Thompson, although it wasn't the day of the defeat. Apparently somebody saw us having dinner together. As I understand the story, and I've heard this from Mr. Thompson himself and from others, the Government

was just teetering on the brink of defeat over a period of time, and the Conservatives of course were desperately trying to retain some support from the Social Credit group because they needed them. Thompson didn't want to see an election called at that time. He had spelled out certain conditions - one controversy was over the budget, I don't remember just what the issues were now - that they wanted the Government to accept if they were going to support it. They said, "If you meet these conditions, we can support you to the extent of not letting the others of the Opposition defeat you on this budget issue." And the story as I heard it from Thompson and others was that this was relayed to Mr. Diefenbaker on this day when the debate was on, and I think Mr. Thompson had been pretty well verbally assured by the Tory go-betweens who had been discussing it with him, that this would be acceded to.

When the House adjourned for dinner that evening, he still had no word back from Mr. Diefenbaker. He apparently told them, "If I don't have this word," (he was scheduled to speak after dinner) "I've made it quite clear I will not support it." And he didn't get the assurance. While he'd indicated before that he would support them, it was on this condition. When he went back after dinner, the undertaking wasn't forthcoming, so he said, "We won't support it."

The coincidence that I happened to have had dinner with Bob Thompson - somebody started to think that I had changed Bob Thompson's mind! As I say, actually it wasn't the day this happened, it was the day before that I had been in Ottawa and had dinner with him. And while we'd discussed the political situation, I certainly didn't advise Bob what he should or shouldn't do. It was his job as a Federal Leader, not mine.

LS: What was the relationship like between yourself and Mr. Thompson - you having been leader of the Government here for many years, and Mr. Thompson as head of Social Credit nationally?

ECM: Well, our relationship was not close. Bob Thompson and I had been friends for many years. I'd known Bob years before, when he was in Ethiopia. He had a very interesting career. He went to Ethiopia in a mission position,

and he became well acquainted with the inner circles of Haile Selassie's government, including Haile Selassie himself. He was given an assignment by Selassie's government to pretty well set up an educational system - he was a teacher. He spent a lot of time over there; he learned the language; in fact he was an interpreter for Haile Selassie's son on one of the tours of North America. So that had been his field of work, and I'd known Bob way back in those days.

As I say, while we were friends and talked from time to time, we didn't have a close relationship. It wasn't a matter of conferring back and forth on what either should do. I've always taken the position (in fact I guess I go to extremes on this) that it would be better if we had a separate type of parties altogether for the federal arena from the provincial. I think there's a constant conflict of interest when you have provincial governments and federal governments of the same political stripe.

LS: Why is that?

ECM: Well, because there's a vested partisan interest which so often overrides the other interest. Let me take a concrete example, and again, I don't say this critically - it was a very normal thing - but I found it amusing, here in Alberta. When the Liberal government was in, before Joe Clark became Prime Minister, it was very interesting that when Joe was elected, quite a number of things which the Tory government here had been screaming to high heaven about the sins of the Liberal government ... those voices fell strangely silent once Joe Clark was elected. They didn't get along, I think, too well with Clark, but there wasn't the same attitude! "This boy deserves a chance."

That's what I mean, that there's a vested party interest that is inevitable when you get two governments. The party position often changes, even though the things they have been complaining about have not changed. All that's changed is the party, either in the Province or in the Federal Government. I think you'd avoid a lot of that if you had a federal party structure which concentrated entirely on federal responsibilities, and in

the provinces you had a provincial party structure. Now, it'll never happen, but it's a good theory.

LS: This leads into another interesting thing that surfaces in 1962 and 1963 - your relationship with the Creditistes. Apparently in June 1962, 26 Creditistes had been elected to the House of Commons. Secondly, apparently Mr. Caouette, head of the Creditiste group, had quite different groups, for instance, about who should be the national leader of the Social Credit party. Apparently he had opposed Mr. Thompson. As I have been able to find out, there were also differences of opinion on nuclear weapons for Canada, which was an issue of this period of time. So I'm interested in your comments on the relationship with the Creditistes, in view of what you've just said about separate national and provincial parties.

ECM: There was a period of time (I forget what the years were) where we took quite an active interest as a provincial party and government in the federal Social Credit structure. I used to speak at their conventions; I used to be quite active on advisory committees and things of this kind, with the national people.

May I say, as far as Mr. Caouette was concerned, he was a man of a lot of ability. He was a dynamic type of fellow. He was a big loss to them; when he went, they disintegrated. But there came a time when the Creditiste position on a number of issues was in conflict with the position of the rest of the national Social Credit organization.

LS: What kind of conflict?

ECM: It revolved around different issues. The Quebec issue was one of them. To some extent, I think even the language issue in some aspects became a problem. I think this nuclear thing was one that you mentioned where there was a difference of opinion. They just weren't on the same wavelength. And finally the national Social Credit association disassociated themselves from the Creditistes. And Caouette went on his own from there on out. From that time on, we pretty well dropped out of the federal stuff

altogether at that stage - they were sort of disintegrating. But for quite a number of years the rest of the national Social Credit organization (which was built primarily in British Columbia and Alberta and a little in Saskatchewan) was disassociated completely from the Credististes.

LS: At that point in time, did you think that was a good move?

ECM: Well, it was an inevitable move under the circumstances. They just weren't on the same wavelength. The Quebec wing, Credististe wing, were just talking a different philosophy and approach altogether from the others. You couldn't reconcile them.

LS: As I understand it, that happened at a certain point in time, and a little later down the road you're saying that your Government became less and less involved with the national organization?

ECM: Yes, this all was fairly well together. You see, in the Diefenbaker sweep the national Social Crediters were wiped out in Alberta - that's when Solon Low was defeated. So we sort of lost touch because there were no Social Crediters from Alberta. And in that election the Credististes elected a block out of Quebec, so they became a dominant factor. That's when the Credististes became really the national Social Credit organization as far as Parliament was concerned.

LS: What were the differences of opinion within the party, including Credististes, whoever spoke for the national party (somebody like Mr. Thompson) and yourself?

ECM: Well, as far as the Credististes were concerned, they were closer to what we talked about away back, the old Douglasite group - the philosophical Douglasites that we had in Alberta in the Insurgency days and so on. They were much more along that line; they were still living back in those days. There were disagreements on that. There were disagreements on the national situation. The Credististes went along with a great deal of what Quebec was arguing for in those days, almost in confrontation with all the rest of

Canada, so there were divisions in that respect. There was a series of things of that kind, where they just didn't think the same way.

LS: Earlier on, had the Social Credit Party of Alberta been active in helping, for instance, set up study groups and things like that in Quebec - going back now.

ECM: Yes. We hadn't too big a role in Quebec. For quite a number of years actually the Social Credit Party in Alberta carried the national movement. But you see, in those days, until the Credististes became really an active force in Quebec, the federal Social Credit group consisted almost entirely of MP's from Alberta. At one time every federal seat but one in Alberta was a Social Crediter. So the national Social Credit Party, as far as the House of Commons was concerned, was really an Alberta party. So we were involved in the sense that we had close liaison with some of those people. And we had a close liaison between the federal and provincial organizations in Alberta as far as the electoral machinery was concerned. We used the same structures and people. And it wasn't until after the Western arm of the national Social Credit movement was wiped out in the Diefenbaker sweep that you had the ascendancy of the Caouette group in Quebec. While we had been backing out more and more from the federal picture prior to that, but from then on we had practically no relation at all.

LS: One final specific question about the national Social Credit. Were you ever approached, or did you ever consider the leadership position with the national Social Credit?

ECM: Oh, I was approached, yes, a number of times. I didn't seriously consider taking it on, but I was pressured to do it.

LS: Why was it not something that you seriously considered?

ECM: Well, first of all, I was committed to the work here in Alberta. The people of Alberta had been very good to me; we'd been reelected year after year after year, and I guess I had sunk most of my life into trying to do

something for Alberta. I didn't feel it was too appropriate to walk off and say, "Okay, now I'm going to do another area." That was one reason. Number two, I wasn't getting younger by that time. Number three, I think I've mentioned before, I have quite a fondness for history, at least the lessons it teaches us, and I wasn't unmindful of the fact that there has never been a provincial premier in Canada that's been a success in federal leadership. George Drew tried it, John Bracken tried it, Tommy Douglas tried it - there are all kinds of them - and they never got it. It's a different ball game. I don't say it can't be done, but it's not what happens.

LS: Any thoughts about why that is?

ECM: I guess it's quite a fundamental change. You're having to deal with the conflicting concerns of a diversified nation, people scattered all over the place. It's a different situation to dealing with a far more cohesive group in a province that pretty well share mutual desires, goals, and so on. I think it would be a fascinating thing, if I was thirty years younger, with the mess we're in in this country today, I would be at it hammer and tongs. But as I say, for some reason it's never worked out; provincial premiers have not been successful, and I think they have become provincially oriented.