LS: We're going to cover the period 1963-64. 1963 in terms of one of the things that started up - the Fulton Favreau(sp?) Formula. During the Pearson years the issue of bring home the BNA Act and to devise an acceptable amending formula - and that was how many years ago? it's still with us - was an issue. I'm interested in your recollections of behind the scenes discussions that happened at that point in time with Pearson people, and I'm also interested in why Mr. Newman would write in his book The Temper of Our Times(?) saying that you had provided an important and early initiative for the Fulton Favreau Formula.

ECM: The question of patriating the Constitution and getting an amending formula came up at several Federal-Provincial conferences during that period. And I want to stress what I think we have said in earlier talks, this was not in an atmosphere of urgency. There was no sense that the country was going to collapse if the constitution wasn't patriated. But off in the distance, in 1967, was looming our centennial year. And the view was expressed that if it was possible to work out an amending formula for the constitution and patriate the constitution, it would be a nice feature along with the other events relating to the 100th anniversary of Confederation - which made very good sense.

There had been attempts before which had not succeeded. It would hardly be fair to say that a lot of them ended in complete disagreement and failure. They just petered out for lack of agreement, and they were put on the shelf, and they turned their attention to other matters.

This started initially when Dave Fulton was Minister of Justice in the Diefenbaker Government. This is where the Fulton Favreau formula came into it. And there were a series of meetings held in trying to work out an amending formula. Then there was a change of government, and Mr. Guy Favreau was Minister of Justice in the Pearson Government. He continued from where Mr. Fulton had initiated this thing before, with the impetus given by the approach of 1967.

As a result of all this, a committee was established under the chairmanship of Guy Favreau, and the members of the committee were the Attorneys General of all the Provinces. It was an eleven-man committee, the ten Attorneys General and the Minister of Justice. I was Attorney General of Alberta at that time; that's why I was involved in the thing from the outset. We had a number of meetings, and made some progress, but there were quite a few sticky points. We finally got the thing pretty well put together. The major block at that time came from Saskatchewan - an NDP government there at the time. They leaned much stronger toward greater centralization of power in Ottawa, which of course was consistent with their socialist philosophy, and they thought that the amendments that were being proposed would weaken the Federal Government, and that there should be a greater concentration of power in the hands of the Federal Government.

So the thing broke down on that point, and it was in abeyance for quite a while. Then there was an election in Saskatchewan, the NDP Government was defeated, and a Liberal government under Ross Thatcher was elected. I recall that we had for many years (and it still goes on today in fact) an annual conference of the Premiers of all the provinces, and this was hosted in turn by different provinces, and that year it was our turn to host the conference out here in Alberta.

When the Government changed in Saskatchewan, and while I didn't know clearly what Mr. Thatcher's position on this would be (because it was a Liberal government and Mr. Pearson's government in Ottawa was pressing to get this moving) I felt it was reasonable to assume that the Saskatchewan Government would take a different stance to what the NDP Government had taken.

So ahead of our Premiers' Conference that fall, I was in Ottawa one time and I went in to see Mr. Pearson, and I talked this over with him because I knew he was anxious to get the thing moving again. I said, "We're having all the Premiers out in Alberta for a Premiers' Conference, and this will be Mr. Thatcher's first presence since the change of government." I wanted to get Mr. Pearson's thoughts on whether he thought it would be appropriate

if I raised this question at the Premiers' Conference and we got Mr.

Thatcher's reaction to it. If it was favourable, then perhaps this would indicate we could reactivate the committee.

At the Premiers' Conference we did raise this. It wasn't raised on the agenda or in the public business of the conference, but I put on a luncheon just with the Premiers one day, apart from all our advisors and other people, and we discussed this. Mr. Thatcher said, "Yes. I'm not knowledgeable of the background of this (because he hadn't been involved in it before), but I certainly think it makes good sense, and as far as we're concerned we'd be happy to move it along." It was a very positive response.

As chairman of the conference I was delegated to go back to Ottawa and advise Mr. Pearson that this was the situation, which I did. And as a result of that measure of agreement on renewing the discussions, Mr. Pearson reconvened a special Federal-Provincial Conference in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island – the good old bastion of Confederation discussions in the early days. And at that Conference there was foreknowledge of what would happen because we had the agreement. That Conference passed an official communique saying that they were all in complete agreement that they should proceed immediately to reactive the committee under the Minister of Justice, with the hope of arriving at a satisfactory amending formula and suggested amendments, and so on, in order to have this thing consummated by the Centennial year.

The committee was reactivated under Guy Favreau; I continued to represent Alberta as Attorney General; and we had a number of meetings. It moved along quite well, and we finally came to a consensus on what became known as the Fulton Favreau Formula. That provided for simple patriation of the Constitution and an amending formula, and some other suggestions and recommendations in it. It was not ideal - I don't think anybody would argue that it was the best thing that could be, but it was certainly the best consensus that it was possible to get. And I guess the most significant thing was that it was agreed to by Quebec, which had always

objected before. Premier Lessage was Premier of Quebec at the time, and he concurred. So we had unanimous agreement as far as the Attorneys General and Minister of Justice were concerned.

Our last meeting, in which the consensus was formalized, was held in Ottawa, concurrently with a Federal-Provincial Conference of First Ministers. We wrapped up our work in the committee and reported back to the Federal-Provincial Conference that we had reached agreement, and presented what was known as the Fulton Favreau Formula. And that was concurred in unanimously by the Federal-Provincial Conference. This was the closest Canada ever came to agreement. Individual Premiers, individual Attorneys General, and the Minister of Justice expressed some concern about some provisions in it, but nevertheless said, "In total, yes, we'll endorse it."

It was formally adopted by the Federal-Provincial Conference, by the Prime Minister and all the Provincial Premiers. (Incidentally we were not proposing a Charter of Rights. That subject had come up a time or two, but because there was no agreement on it they had enough sense to put it off on a back burner and say, "Let's not fight over that; let's get on with the business of patriation.") It was decided that, because of the importance of it, each of the Premiers would go back to his Legislature and have a resolution passed by the Legislature endorsing the formula, so that it would have the endorsation not just of the Premier but of the Legislatures, and the Federal Government would do the same thing in the House of Commons so we'd have concurrence by eleven government.

And of course that's where the sad fact of the thing came into the story. Well, there were two things - I don't know whether I've mentioned this earlier or not, but they'll bear repeating in this context. One was rather amusing. It was the case of Newfoundland. Premier Smallwood was Premier at the time; he ran Newfoundland as a one-man operation. And I always remember Joey Smallwood saying to the Prime Minister, "Look, if I say this is alright, it's alright; there's no need for me to go back and go through all this fuss of putting a resolution through the House. I'm not going to

do that; if I say it's okay, it's okay. Go ahead." So Joey never did go to his House for a resolution.

However, that became academic anyway, because when Mr. Lessage went back to Quebec he ran into very violent opposition. Daniel Johnson, who was the head of the Opposition in Quebec at the time, and a very capable, aggressive man, took the position that Lessage had sold out to Ottawa in this deal, and betrayed Quebec's interests, and all the old story. And he built up so much opposition that a short time later Premier Lessage had to come back to the Prime Minister and say, "I'm sorry but I can't take a resolution to my House because it would be defeated."

So that's where the Fulton Favreau formula died on the vine. It was an unfortunate thing because, as I say, that was the closest that Canada had ever come to agreement on this matter. There were none of the divisions that there are today; it was not a matter of wrangling from one end of the country to the other. It was thrashed out with hours and hours of committee work and concurred in, and everybody was very hopeful and optimistic, but it broke down in Quebec.

LS: In your opinion, did Mr. Lessage just not have a good pulse of his Province? or what was the ...?

ECM: Well, of course Quebec is not an easy Province to govern. There's sharp division of opinion. Lessage carried a great deal of influence. Certainly had he not been a strong leader it would never have got to the stage it did. But Mr. Johnson was very aggressive - that was the Union Nationale, the old Duplessis party. And in Quebec if anybody wanted to argue on almost anything that it was "sold out to Ottawa" that's all you needed to generate a lot of opposition. And that's what Johnson zeroed in on. He told them that Lessage, because he was a Liberal, had sold out to his friend Mike Pearson in Ottawa, and they weren't going to let that be put over on Quebec. So that was the end of the Fulton Favreau Formula.

LS: Is there, in your opinion, any way of resurrecting that approach?

ECM: Well, I have suggested in the current debate on the Constitution to one or two fellows in government across Canada that they wouldn't make any mistake to dig out the old Fulton Favreau Formula and update it. It never took hold, I think primarily because it didn't touch this Bill of Rights business, and of course Trudeau has always taken the position, "If there isn't a Chater of Rights I won't even look at it." So I guess they felt there was no point as long as he takes that attitude.

LS: Did something happen to the country when that happened? When Quebec came back and said "No", what was your sense of what Canadians thought?

ECM: Well, I think I'd be correct in saying that at that time (and in many respects it's the same today if the politicians wouldn't make it otherwise) there was no great public interest in this thing. The Fulton Favreau committees didn't come about as a result of public pressure. There was very little public interest in it. It came about because the members of the Federal-Provincial Conferences, the Prime Minister and Premiers, thought it was an appropriate and desirable thing to do, but it was not done under any sense of urgency or that the country was going to die on the vine if it wasn't met by a certain date and all this stuff. And as a result, when the thing failed, I think a large part of the population just yawned once more and there wasn't any great interest. And there were the ones that felt (and as you know this feeling has been in Canada for a long time), "There's Quebec again balking everything that's agreed by the rest of Canada." There was that reaction, but that was little more than passing observations, and three weeks after they were going on worrying about the rent and the Constitution was far from their minds.

As I've said so many times, that has always been the situation in this country. The Prime Minister of today is completely wrong and he's completely untruthful when he argues that this matter of constitutional patriation is a great matter of public urgency. As far as the public is concerned, they couldn't care less. Maybe they should, but the rank and file don't.

LS: What was Mr. Pearson's reaction then?

ECM: He was very disappointed. He had looked forward, I think, to this being sort of a crowning feature of the Centennial year's activities, and he was very, very disappointed. But as I've said before, Mr. Pearson was a diplomat. If you tried to get a bargain and you didn't get it, well you just went your way quietly and tried again some other way. While he was disappointed, he didn't make any great issue of it.

LS: One final question. Were you surprised by Quebec's reaction?

ECM: I wasn't over-surprised. I was very hopeful because I thought that Mr. Lessage, who had great prestige in Quebec... I had grave doubts during much of the committee work that we could get agreement there, because I was afraid that Mr. Lessage would find he couldn't agree. I think I was more fearful of that than of what would happen if he agreed, because I thought he had the weight in Quebec to put it through if he agreed to it. And to be fair to him, I think he could have had it not been picked up by the Opposition and made a major political issue. That generated enough heat that he wasn't able to do it.

LS: Did you know Mr. Lessage beyond the committees?

ECM: Well, I met him many times of course at Federal-Provincial Conferences. He was a Minister in Pearson's Government before he was Premier of Quebec, so I knew him in that sense. I met him a good many times at various meetings.

LS: What was your opinion of him?

ECM: He was quite a strong leader. He was a rather colourful man. He had been an actor in his younger days; he had a bit of a flair for publicity. But Lessage of course introduced quite a new era in Quebec - what they called the Quiet Revolution. The upheaval in the system of education was probably one of the biggest things that happened in his regime. Prior to that time, the educational system of Quebec had been very much dominated by the

Catholic Church because many of the schools were church schools, and at one time the Government of Quebec had very little role in education at all. It was operated almost exclusively by the Church. And Lessage became convinced that an upgrading, updating, of their educational system was fundamental to Quebec's staying in the mainstream in Canada. And I guess more than any other person he was responsible for that complete transformation of Quebec's educational system. That had some side effects that I think it would be safe to say Mr. Lessage himself did not envisage at the time.

LS: Like what?

ECM: Well, one of the most significant, in my assessment, was the weakening of the role of the Church in Quebec. When they went into the public system of education and were no longer dependent on the Church for so much of the educational structure of the Province, the young people coming out of that revamped educational system were far less closely associated with the Church than had been the case when that's where they got their education. As a result, there were all kinds of new ideas being discussed which I don't think would ever have come out of the old regime. In the rural areas of Quebec especially in those days, when people were born in a community the Church and the Church school were the centre of their activities as children, and the centre of the family and community activities — they lived there, they married there, they died there. And that happened with so many of them. But with the educational upheaval, the younger people of Quebec became much more mobile, involving themselves in far more things, and there was a whole new attitude developed.

One of the things, as I say, that I think Mr. Lessage would regret (he'd probably consider it an inevitable result of that type of a public education system) was the great desertion of the Church by thousands of the younger generation. As a result, the Church lost proportionately its influence over a very large section of the population of Quebec, until today I think everyone would agree that while the Church there is still an

important, dominant factor, it doesn't control the destiny of Quebec in the way it did in the early years.

LS: Mr. Manning, that raises a much larger issue - the whole thing of the role of a church in a society in the sense of the old argument about making it quite separate from other aspects of life.

ECM: Well, it does, and of course people have to choose between the two things. If you're going to take the spiritual dimension out of education, as a classic example - and that's the thing that was underscored in Quebec - then you're going to get certain results. You'll get a much wider scope of so-called free discussion, free opinion, conflicting opinions and all the controversies and schisms that go along with it. That's the price. If you take the other course and say education should be an integral part of the church's ministry, that you shouldn't divorce the spiritual dimension from routine secular education, then of course you're going to get a different result. You have to opt between the two.

LS: This brings back Mr. Aberhart, Mr. Aberhart being a teacher and educator.

ECM: That's true in the broad principle. The fundamental difference, of course, in the educational system as it was, I guess you could say, in all the rest of Canada... Now Newfoundland had a unique situation but that's different; there the Anglican church ran the schools for a long, long time. In Western Canada (and you've mentioned the case of Mr. Aberhart as a teacher) you had individuals throughout the educational system who exerted a significant personal Christian influence in their particular sphere of education. But it was not a universal thing. Whereas in the situation you had in Quebec, the church educational system in those days was the system in the province. It wasn't a matter of an individual priest here or there or something like that. It was, that was the system. And they moved from that and you saw in the years that followed a great exodus of young people from the church and the corresponding decline of the church's influence in deciding the course of the Province and the society.

LS: I guess what I'm trying to clarify is your opinion about whether in fact an organized church, whether it's the Roman Catholic or the Anglicans, should actually be running the school system. Or whether in fact the values that are imparted by the religious concerns and the educational concerns - there's a distinction there, I think. On that issue, what side would you come down on?

ECM: Well, let me put it this way. The operation of an educational system as part of a church - that is not the church's proper role. I say that from the standpoint of accepting the biblical position that the church is not just a man-made organization, something that a group of people got together and said, "We'll have a church." The church was founded by Christ himself; it was he that said, "On this rock I will build my church," and so on. And the church therefore has a divine origin as well as a human origin, and it has a divine commission - not a curriculum decided by a committee but God's instruction to his church in the biblical record was the church's responsibility: to be a witness to the deity and lordship and resurrection of Christ, and a place where believers in Christ can come to be built up in the knowledge of him and knowledge of the scriptures and all the things that pertain to their spiritual growth and development. Now, if the church takes on as part of its divine commission something which it was never commissioned to do, to that extent it loses its strength which it possesses only as long as it does what it was founded - not by men, but by Christ himself - to do. And to my mind that's one of the tragic things that's happened to many churches. They become just another man-made organization. They've ceased to be distinctive from man-made organizations.

Having said all that, because the role of the church in being a witness to society of the deity and lordship of Christ and everything that he stands for and stood for, if the church ignores those things altogether and says, "We're only interested in telling you, but what you do about it, that's up to do," then I think it's making a mistake on that side. Education, to my mind, has lost one of its most important ingredients when the spiritual aspect was put away on the back burner. I don't think you have to have the

schools run by the church to have a spiritual dimension in education. I think the ideal thing is where in the educational system, distinct and separate from the church altogether, the people operating it recognize that the human being is such that he does have a spiritual as well as a secular and material dimension and that that has to be respected. And the idea of abolishing all respect or recognition of spiritual verities from the classroom on the grounds that this might be treading on somebody's toes in the matter of religious convictions - we've paid a terrible price for it. Society wouldn't be in the mess it's in today if we hadn't taken that course.

LS: Would you say that was consistent with Mr. Aberhart's view?

ECM: I think so.

LS: I'd like to move on now and look at some specific legislation in 1964. One of the pieces of legislation was Chapter 9 which was the Calgary CP Agreement in terms of expropriating land and right-of-way in downtown Calgary. I'm interested in any recollections that you have of the Government's role in something that's obviously a municipal development, and also Mr. Sinclair and what sort of person he was - he was the vice-president then of Canadian Pacific. Apparently he was cross-examined by you at some time - that's a quote out of the Journal.

ECM: The agreement involved in that piece of legislation was the agreement made between the City of Calgary and the CPR that was required to be ratified by the Legislature. The Legislature had no role in developing the agreement; that was entirely a matter of the negotiations between the city and the railway company. But having arrived at an agreement then they brought it to the Legislature, and it didn't become effective until it was formalized by ratification of the House.

Without going into the detail which is perhaps not pertinent to what we're talking about, the CPR has a large tract of land in the city of Calgary.

Their main line runs right through the heart of Calgary and takes up a considerable amount of land for their tracks and yards and so on. The city of Calgary over the years have often talked about trying to get some alteration of that situation because it took a big chunk of land right out of the heart of Calgary. There was talk at one time that perhaps the railway could move their line to some other location altogether to get the tracks and the nuisance of trains and freight shunting around right in the middle of the city out of the centre. It also gave rise to a lot of discussions between the railway company and the city on taxation. Some of the lands were exempt from taxation because they were lands turned over to the CPR as part of the original deal of building the railway across the country.

LS: We're talking about way back, in the 1800's?

ECM: Oh yes, yes, away back. It was the carryover of some of those old deals that were made at that time. Then there was the matter of the Palliser Hotel, CPR hotel, built right on their railway property. It was on CPR property, should it be taxed by the city? These were the things that the city and CPR had been arguing about for a long time, and they worked out this agreement and came to us for ratification.

Bills of this kind are referred to a committee of the Legislature that gives them first reading, and then they go, I think, to the Municipal Affairs or the Agriculture Committee, a committee of the whole house. At the committee, the sponsors (in this case the City of Calgary) would appear before the committee and explain the agreement and why they wanted this and that, and of course the CPR representatives were all there too to present their side of the case and to answer any questions of the Legislature.

Mr. Ian Sinclair, who at that time was vice-president and senior legal counsel for the railway and who later became President (and just recently retired from the presidency), was a very outstanding man, a man with a fabulous mind and dynamic energy, was there representing the CPR.

This reference to "cross examination" is probably a little bit far-fetched. In a committee hearing, any members of the committee ask questions of any of the witnesses appearing before it, and I raised a number of questions on the agreement with Mr. Sinclair. I remember we didn't quite see eye to eye on some of it; we had a bit of an argument. But that's not uncommon when you're talking to lawyers in a situation of that kind!

Our conclusion, as I recall it (this is a little vague; it's been a long time back) was that neither the city nor the railway had fully done their homework on this whole thing. There were quite a few gaps, and the thing was not accepted on those grounds, or at least changes were made in it. It was quite an interesting hearing. Any hearing where Mr. Sinclair appeared was always interesting because he was a terrific fellow in that respect; he was a very skilled lawyer and a dynamic chap.

LS: Sort of flamboyant?

ECM: No, he wasn't flamboyant. He would cut right to the point on anything. He was very precise, and very outspoken. Ian Sinclair never dressed an answer up in words to make it pleasing to the people that heard the answer. He said it, and "told it like it was"; that was Ian's way. I got to know him very well later, in fact we were very good friends, still are. But he was quite an interesting man. And extremely capable - I would say probably one of Canada's greatest business executives was Ian Sinclair.

LS: Just a final clarification on that legislation then. When it comes along and your Government feels that the homework wasn't done by both sides? or just the city of Calgary?

ECM: Yes, I think we were more concerned about the City of Calgary, because after all they were part of the structure of the Province. The CPR just happened to be a company that they were dealing with.

LS: Then, does this legislation go back out and come back in again?

ECM: I don't remember what the final disposition was. It seems to me the thing was not passed the first time; I think the agreement collapsed, in fact.

LS: That's what was reported.

ECM: I think the two parties - certainly the city - realized at the end of the committee hearings that there were so many unanswered questions and unsatisfactory answers to questions that the House would not be prepared to approve it. And I think they just took the thing back and said, "We'll go at it from some other angle."

LS: Do you think that going into it they felt that the ratification was just a formality?

ECM: Well, I wouldn't say they felt it was a formality. I don't think they had anticipated that the committee would probably go into it as thoroughly as they went into it, and as a result came to the conclusion that this was not a very good agreement, it wasn't well put together.

LS: One final question that comes to mind coming out of this and having to do with somebody like Mr. Sinclair. Why do men like Mr. Sinclair not join the public sector and work in government?

ECM: They would be so terribly frustrated with the red tape of the public sector that they would never survive. Mr. Sinclair is a classic example. He's a doer, and he's irritated by anything that gets in the way of getting something done when you decide it needs to be done, ought to be done. He wants to go ahead and do it. The cumbersome, laboursome process of Parliament and Legislatures and the public sector would just drive a man like that up the wall. To my view, a fellow like Mr. Sinclair wouldn't be caught within ten feet of a thing of that kind under any circumstances.

LS: Did you personally find the bureaucracies cumbersome?

ECM: Always. That's one of the most frustrating things of public life.

Fortunately, if you're in the government and particularly if you have the privilege of being at the top of the government, you're in a much better position than probably anybody else to cut through the stuff. In other words, you're in a different position than the poor fellow that's dealing with the bureaucracy from the outside. That's where he gets bogged down.

LS: Another piece of legislation, Chapter 12, Commercial Services to Business and Industry. What kind of legislation was that?

ECM: That was a piece of legislation that I think I would say, in retrospect, if I was doing it all over again, I doubt if we'd ever have brought in that legislation.

LS: Why?

ECM: Well, it did end up by involving the Government in an area of the private sector that I doubt there was any real legitimate need for the Government to get into. What this did was set up in the Department of Trade and Industry a Commercial Services Branch, and that Branch primarily had two functions. One, it was to act in an advisory capacity and to encourage entrepreneurship and business organization, in other words encouragement to the private sector. That's fine, I have no quarrel with that at all.

The second part of it was the setting up of actual merchandise depots for what was called the Provincial Marketing Board. The Marketing Board purchased and resold certain commodities. There was always a good argument advanced as to why they should handle a certain commodity — either there was a shortage or there was no competiton, or the public was being gouged by a monopoly, but they operated a number of depots around the province. They handled a lot of farm equipment and stuff of that kind. I think, in fairness to them, they did a pretty good job as far as the services they

rendered. Their prices were more than competitive, which annoyed the private sector people in the field very greatly - and I can understand their annoyance.

That is the area, while I think there were some very strong reasons, whether they would be considered really valid reasons, for the Department going into anything it went into. But in retrospect, having regard to the whole picture in society as it's developed over the years and the adverse effect on the private sector and on the economy of the country that's resulted from governments getting involved in those fields, I doubt whether the benefits outweighed the adverse effects.

The thing was discontinued later on. It was more or less an experiment. It operated for a number of years. It was headed up by a man by the name of George Clash, who was a very, very capable man. He came from Medicine Hat; he'd been a merchandiser down there. He operated the service very effectively, but it was finally wound down and eliminated.

LS: Another piece of legislation that I find interested in 1964 was Chapter 38 which was the Alberta Investment Fund, where apparently the Government backed savings and investment certificates. What were the provisions for that?

ECM: This was really the Government setting up a structure through which individuals could invest money by buying certificates in what was really an investment fund. There were two types of certificates, as I recall. One were savings certificates which were redeemable - a person could bring them back and redeem them at almost any time. And there were what were called Investment Certificates - there was a difference drawn between savings certificates and investment certificates. The savings certificates were redeemable, the investment certificates were term certificates and were not redeemable ahead of the term. The idea of that latter one was that those funds would be available for investment on behalf of that fund. It was sort of a managed investment fund, actually, operated by the Government.

It was not something that the public responded to; there was very little use of it and it was wound down and eliminated not too long after. It had rather a short life.

We had a lot of discussions about it at the time; we felt there was need for something like that on a provincial basis. I think one of the things that influenced us - in those days most of the companies that were in that type of work (that is, the investment companies) were not Alberta companies. Their management and headquarters were outside the Province, and there was a feeling (rightly or wrongly) that a lot of the money that was raised by the sale of trust company certificates and all this type of investment instruments left the Province. Our idea was to have something that was within the Province that would be invested in the Province.

We did the same thing in the insurance field; we went into life insurance and fire insurance. The idea was that the revenues, reserves, would be invested within the Province instead of being drained off to the head offices of companies that were managed outside.

That was the thinking behind it. But as I say, this did not take hold with the public. It didn't offer any great investment attractions over and above what you could get in the private sector in trust companies and so on, and it was not continued very long. It was wound up.

LS: But it is interesting about the thinking that was in the background of it.

ECM: Yes, the things that led to it being done are still causes that are prominent in provincial life today. The idea of trying to keep funds within the Provinces... There's always been the feeling in the West that the money's being drained off to the head office investments of the larger companies. That is probably less true today than it used to be because most of those companies have diversified and have pretty substantial management offices in the Western provinces as well as at the head office. That's true of the banks; I guess all of them have vice-presidents

stationed in every province in the country today. That wasn't true in the early days.

LS: It's a different milieu.

ECM: Yes.

LS: The next is Chapter 51 which is on quite a different scale and level, and that's the Margarine Act. I'm wondering two things: the provisions, but also the role of consumer lobby groups in terms of your experience with this legislation, and why was it such an emotional issue?

ECM: It's funny, you know, in all the important issues that people have to live with and governments have to deal with, I guess in every jurisdiction you will find there are always a few things which are relatively unimportant which become highly emotional public concerns. I can think of three of them, and this was one of them.

Another was the matter of Daylight Saving Time. We used to have more wars waged over Daylight Saving Time than anything for a while. There was legislation even on that. People get all excited about these things. It really doesn't make much difference whether you get up when your watch says 8:00 or 9:00; you get up when the sun's shining and you go to bed when it stops! But there were groups - particularly the farm organizations - you'd think the whole economy was going to grind to a halt if we went on Daylight Saving Time.

The other one was fluoridation. There was a long, long war over whether municipalities should be permitted to put fluoride in drinking water. This ranged all the way from professional groups of dentists who said this was a desirable thing to do because it prevented caries in the teeth of children to people who saw in it a subtle Soviet Communist plot to poison the drinking water and paralyze the population — and we had everything in between. That war raged for years.

This one on margarine was of concern to the agricultural people.

Margarine, of course, was just coming in in those days; it wasn't a popular product. And to get it accepted in the marketplace the manufacturers of margarine wanted to colour it the same colour as butter. This was understandable; people were going to buy it in lieu of butter, and in its own natural state it was white, kind of an unappetizing putty-looking white. Well, the dairy industry and the farmers got all exercised about this because this was going to undercut the dairy industry, they were going to put this substitute product on the market in place of butter, and it was being done deceptively because it was being artificially coloured to make it look like butter to delude and deceive the poor housewife in the marketplace. This was the war.

So what the legislation dealt with was the colouring of margarine. The dairy people wanted them to have to sell the stuff in its natural state, and then they had colouring that they sold with it, and the housewife had to do her own colouring. Now, the colouring didn't add anything to the margarine; it was purely a matter of the esthetics of the thing. So this finally ended up in legislation govering the colour of margarine.

Of course, in time all that died too, and margarine became a product just like anything else.

LS: I remember you'd get a bag of it with a little button of colour.

ECM: That's right, you squirted this stuff in it and mixed it up and then you had coloured margarine.

LS: Another thing in talking to Preston about some of these things - he said that when your Government was putting millions of dollars in to highway construction, people were interested in that, but what they were really interested in were these little campsites along the way. He and I discussed, why was it that these kinds of things (you've named three, and the campsites) are extremely emotional? Why?

ECM: Oh, I think that's not too unnatural a reaction. The individual is interested in the thing that touches him every day of his life, right close to home, near by. The campsites to him - that was someplace... the wealthy tourist could go and stay at Jasper Part Lodge, but this was something for the rank and file of people. Human nature is interesting that way. It's one of the things you learn in public life. It's often much more difficult to get people interested in the big, profound issues, than it is in the little nitty-gritty things.

I remember a classic. This comes to mind, an example I used a number of times in later years because it struck me kind of funny at the time. I went out to a place one night to give a lecture - a political meeting. This was at a time when the Cold War was pretty tense and people were very worried about what was happening - the whole East/West conflict after the War. I was supposed to be giving what I thought was quite a learned lecture on the implications of this Cold War, to Canada and the world and North America. So I go on like this for three-quarters of an hour and then we threw the meeting open for questions and it was all quiet for a few minutes, then a dear old farmer sitting down a couple of rows from the front got up and said, "I'd like to ask the Premier when the Highways Department is going to fill that mudhole in front of my gate." I always thought it was just a classic example; the dear old soul, all the time I was talking about international hassles, he's sitting there thinking about getting stuck in this mudhole with his truck. That's all he wanted to know; he couldn't care less about the Cold War if we fixed the mudhole.

LS: When you're trying to run a government, and you know that these things take a disproportionate amount of energy and time -

ECM: Well, they do, but they're human concerns, and government is there to serve people. It seems to me government has to take a sort of dual role in things of this kind. One, you have to recognize that your first responsibility is to serve the people that you're governing - not to rule them but to serve them. And if they're worried about the mudhole in front of their gate they have every legitimate reason to be worried about it. If

you can get somebody to put some gravel in it, fine. You've solved somebody's problem for him.

But at the same time, you have a responsibility in government to give attention to these bigger, long-range issues that the rank and file of people in general are not going to give attention to. There'll be individuals among them concerned about those things, but as a collective body, society is not going to deal with those things. First, because they're hopelessly at a loss as to what to do about most of them. And they're remote - something's going to happen maybe 20 years from now if we don't change course now. A fellow's not sitting up nights worrying about what's going to happen 20 years from now.

A classic case of that is told in the old illustration of a fellow drifting into a lecture by an astronomer. He's in the back row and this very learned astronomer's holding forth, and he says, "It's clearly established that the sun is losing its heat, and in 20 million years the temperature will be down where it's doubtful whether it can sustain life on this earth." And this guy at the back seat has been half-asleep in this long scientific lecture, but he heard this and he jumped up and said, "Would ou repeat that, what did you say?" So the fellow said, "In 20 million years the heat of the sun's going to be down to where it's doubtful that it will sustain life on the earth." And the fellow heaves a sigh and says, "Oh, well, that's okay. I thought you said 20 thousand years!"

That illustrates the attitude of people. If it's 20 million, don't get worried. 20 thousands, well maybe I'd better!

So the public don't become personally involved and it doesn't touch them the same if it's broad and big and national or international, as compared with what they're going to have to put up with next week in their home or their community.

LS: Is it frustrating for public life then?

ECM: Well, yes, in a sense it's frustrating because, for one thing, it does divert your time and energy to things which you may feel are really not of any great magnitude. But I come back to my point. What are you there for? You're there to serve people, and you're there to serve little people as well as big people. And if some fellow on a farm that nobody ever heard of is worried about something, that problem is just as entitled to attention by government as if it's a multinational company. The only difference is the size. The legitimacy of his cause is just as much when he's little.

LS: Another piece of legislation (there are two more to go) in 1964 was Chapter 65, Nursing Home Care. I don't if that was an amendment, or was that a new act?

ECM: That was a new act. This really was instituting nursing homes in the Province, and this was, you might say, to sort of round off the facilities for the provincial health program that had been worked on for years. I mentioned before, I think, Dr. W. W. Cross who was our Minister of Health for 25 years, and the man probably more responsible than any single person for the health services of this Province; the foundations of most of the programs we have today evolved from Dr. Cross's time.

He was recommending and the Government was supporting him in driving for a structure that involved four types of physical facilities for general care. There was the senior citizens' home for people who were considered to be in health where they didn't need medical or even nursing attention. Then we had the active service hospitals for people that needed the full hospital care. There were auxiliary hospitals for ones that didn't require the full facilities of an active hospital. But there was a gap in our services for these people who were usually elderly, could no longer properly take care of themselves in a senior citizens' home but really didn't need to be in a hospital. They just needed nursing attention and somebody to keep an eye on them. The nursing homes were intended to fill that gap. If their health started to get to the condition where they

shouldn't be alone or be on their own in a senior citizens' home, they could go into a nursing home and there you had, not medical care (on call, but not resident) but trained nurses. Any normal little thing that went wrong with people, there was somebody there that could either take care of it or recognize that it was serious enough to need medical attention, in which case they'd bring in medical service or move them to an auxiliary or active service hospital.

LS: I think I recall where we touched on some of this and we had talked about your five-year plan.

ECM: Yes, that's right; it was involved in the five-year program.

LS: This legislation is a follow-through to that?

ECM: Part of that.

LS: The final piece of legislation was a University Act, Chapter 101. I'm interested in what the provisions of that were.

ECM: That was only an amendment; it wasn't a new act. As I recall, there were a couple of things emphasized in it. One was the establishment of a General Faculty Council and one a Coordinating Council. I think they had some parallel structures to those before, but this was clarifying their roles, giving them a more important role in the university as the universities were growing at that time.

LS: Also, the whole development of Calgary was around this time, wasn't it?

ECM: Yes, I've forgotten the year. You see, when Calgary University was initially established it was established as a branch of the University of Alberta as Edmonton was known in those days, and this of course did not sit well with Calgary from the very start. They thought this was just something terrible to think that Calgary would operate a branch of a

university at Edmonton! So they pressured from the very outset for local autonomy, to have a full-fledged university, which was done by legislation.

LS: In 1964 there was a suggestion that you made, and it had again to do with Federal/Provincial cost-sharing programs. I'd like clarification on part of it. Apparently, and this is a direct quote from the Calgary Herald of March 11th, 1964, "Alberta will once more ask for a complete review of federal-provincial cost-sharing programs, Premier Manning said Tuesday." Then it goes on to say the following (and this is where I'd like clarification), "He (meaning yourself) suggested the study might show that a federal-provincial foundation might be set up to meet the base needs of every Canadian in these areas (and I'm assuming that's health and education) regardless of the province of residence. The foundation might be financed from personal and corporate income taxes, succession duties and a retail turnover tax." What was that all about?

ECM: It arose out of the discussions at the Federal-Provincial Conferences on the tax-sharing agreements, and particularly as they related to shared-cost programs. We were concerned from the outset - it was one reason why we opposed quite a number of these programs - that more and more this meant federal intervention into fields for which the provinces were responsible as far as the Constitution was concerned. Health and education were provincial responsibilities; they were not federal. And the way the Federal Government was interjecting itself into those fields was really by buying its way in, by saying to the provinces, "This is your responsibility of course (they acknowledged all that very freely) but you all say you need more money, and we're prepared to share the cost with you." But then they became a partner in the program. It was a back-door way of the Federal Government getting into the fields of provincial jurisdiction in the fields of health, welfare, education, and so on. We were always fearful of that. That was one concern.

The other one I think I mentioned previously - and history has borne this out - most of these cost-share programs (I guess you could say almost all

of them) were initiated by the Federal Government. They were usually political programs; they usually came up before a federal election. The provinces were really left with little option, especially the poorer provinces. If Ottawa came along and said, "We'll pay 50% of this health program" or "50% of this education program", when the provinces couldn't afford the program themselves, it was very hard (almost politically impossible) for them to say, "We don't want it," because they could get it at half price. That was the bargain.

But the concern we had (and many other provinces had) was that while Ottawa was very good at initiating these things on that basis, after a few years they'd decide to pull out. Then the province of course would be put in a very difficult position, again particularly the poorer provinces. The Maritimes were the ones that worried most about this. Once you've established a health service, for example, paid for half and half by the two levels of government, and then Ottawa says, "We're withdrawing," it's very hard for the province to discontinue that program. But they're left with the alternative of either discontinuing it, which would bring a very serious adverse public reaction, or else picking up 100% of the cost themselves, which they simply couldn't afford to do.

Because of that type of problem, we proposed in this matter you raised, that perhaps the better way of dealing with these basic social services would be to establish a national foundation, take them out from government administration altogether so these programs would not be administered by the Federal Government or the Provincial Government but by a national foundation which would get its funds by the provinces and the Federal Government agreeing to turn over to that foundation the revenue from certain sources. We suggested corporate and personal income tax and succession duties, but those were more illustrative. It didn't have to be those.

The idea had some acceptance. The Federal people didn't like it because it would have defeated what we always feared was one of their objectives in so many of these things, which was getting what they called the "federal

presence" in these fields. But I still think it was a good idea myself. I think that, in the first place, a foundation could operate and develop these programs independent of political activities altogether because the foundation would not be of government, it would not be looking to elections. Let it develop the improvements to the programs, decide what the revenues accruing to the foundation would support, and then build its case accordingly, free from the political pressures on government.

I thought it was quite an innovative idea, but it didn't fly.

LS: You say you got some acceptance. Was it then from provincial levels?

ECM: Yes, some of the provinces thought it had merit.

LS: I'd like to change from that theme to the Alberta theme and talk about a couple of instances that there was a lot of press on, and get clarification on those. One involved the Provincial Treasurer, Edgar Hindman. On July 28th of 1964 it was reported in the <u>Journal</u> that you "requested and received" the resignation of Mr. Hindman. What was that all about?

ECM: Mr. Hindman was a very, very capable man. He represented the riding of Cardston down in southern Alberta. He was quite a successful businessman in his own right, and he was our Provincial Treasurer. He did a good job as Provincial Treasurer. Mr. Hindman's concept of what was appropriate for a Minister of the Crown, particularly a Treasurer, to do in the public sector while in the position of a Minister, and mine, were not the same. Mr. Hindman was involved with a number of companies as a Director and positions of one kind or another. Some of these were outside Alberta altogether. He took the position that as long as the Government wasn't dealing with these companies and as long as they were not influenced or affected by actions of the Government, there was no reason why a Minister shouldn't do this. My view was that a Minister of the Crown couldn't do that kind of thing - that you had to divorce yourself from those things.

That's what our disagreement was. When I say "disagreement", we didn't have any fight over this at all. But a number of cases came to my attention from people who'd be dealing with some company and they'd mention, "Well, Mr. Hindman of course is a director of that company," or "Mr. Hindman's connected with this in some way or other." And I became concerned because there were were not a lot but there were several of these. It was particularly important, in my view, in the case of the Treasurer. And the one case that brought it to a head as far as I was concerned was people who became involved in a company or two, invested in a company or two and I think lost money, and their observation when somebody said, "Why did you go into the thing?" was, "Well, I didn't know much about it but I noticed that one of the Directors was Hon. Mr. Hindman, and he's Treasurer of the Provinces. He would know whether the thing's sound or not. If he felt it was a solid enough company to be associated with, I assumed it was alright." This is the indirect effect of this kind of thing.

I'd spoken to Mr. Hindman about this a time or two. He always assured me that there was absolutely no conflict, but when a couple of these things came up I finally said, "Ted, this just can't go on." So I asked him for his resignation, which he gave me, and that was that. Of course there was no public fanfare about this; there was no big single thing that brought this to public attention, but then of course there was speculation - "Why did you ask for his resignation?" And I gave the minimum statement on it; I said that Mr. Hindman and I disagreed on the matter of ministerial involvement in private sector companies when he was in the Government. I didn't want to make a big thing out of it because I don't think Mr. Hindman did anything that was dishonest or anything of that kind; it was just that his idea of propriety for a Minister and mine were just not the same.

LS: Was that difficult for you as Premier?

ECM: Oh, yes. He was a colleague. I'd worked very closely with him, and of course I was Treasurer myself for ten years. We were good friends; I'm glad to say that it didn't end our friendship at all; we were always good

friends after. He was a very sensible man. He said, "Well, I don't agree with you, but if that's the way you feel, here's my resignation." That's what I was asking for.

LS: Was this the only instance in the history of your Government where you in fact requested and received a resignation?

ECM: No, there was another one. I asked for a resignation of a Minister of Education one time. When I say I asked, I happened to be away when it actually came to a head - no, I'm sorry I was there when it was consummated. The Minister of Education, a man by the name of Mr. Ansley - and that was a disagreement over policy in connection with the Social Credit Board that we've referred to before. The Board came up with a report recommending some things which were completely contrary to what the Government was prepared to approve, and we made it very clear, in fact the Board was disbanded shortly after this.

We mentioned in one of our early talks about Major Douglas sending a couple of emissaries over here. One of them was Mr. L. D. Byrne, and he had been made Minister of the Department of Economic Affairs which was a Department of Government primarily set up for post-war reconstruction work. But he still worked as chief advisor to the Board, and he concurred in some of the things that the Board recommended in this report. And we asked for his resignation. Mr. Ansley took the position that this was not fair; he was just expressing his conviction. So I said to Mr. Ansley, "Well, Earl, you can't support that position and the position of the Cabinet. The whole doctrine of Cabinet solidarity - you either support it or you don't support it. Whether you agree with it or not, in a matter of this kind this is the Government's position." "Well," he said, "I think it was wrong." And I said, "Earl, if you feel that way you can't consistently remain in the Government." So he said, "Well, I have no reason for resigning from the Government." So I said, "Well you have now. I'm asking for your resignation." So that was that.

LS: Those were the only two instances?

ECM: The only ones who were asked for resignations, yes.

LS: What was the understanding you Ministers had, then, in terms of that.

ECM: Well, when a Minister came in I made quite clear that the standpoint of propriety was one of the things at the top of the list as far as we were concerned. You did what was right; you didn't do certain things, not only whether you could do it legally or not. We had very little trouble of that kind. Occasionally something would come up, but usually it was a matter of an honest mistake or misunderstanding.

LS: Would you say that was due to the kind of leadership you gave?

ECM: Oh, I don't know. I think where these problems do arise sometimes is that it's not made clear what the leader of the Government expects of his Ministers, and they're sort of left on their own to decide what's acceptable and what isn't. That's fine if they all think the same way as the leader, but I think in fairness to a Minister, if you have strong convictions that there are certain proprieties that must be observed, you tell a man that when he comes into your Cabinet. "These are the rules we play by." Then, if he doesn't want to play by them, you have a perfectly free hand to say, "Well, that's your choice, but we play by these rules, so nice to have had you with us; we hope you enjoy yourself in the future."

LS: One other individual, one of your Ministers, who received a lot of press in this period of time, was Alfred Hooke. Apparently he was a friend of Ed Leger's. I don't know - that was reported. Certainly the relationship with that Edmonton Alderman. Also, the whole issue of free accommodation at Regent Towers in Victoria and apparently they were owned by Dr. Allard's company. I guess there was some suggestion that in return for free accommodation Mr. Hooke could use his influence in your Cabinet to advance Dr. Allard's financial interests.

Mr. Hooke is an interesting individual, but this is an interesting case. What was this all about?

ECM: It really touched on two things. Mr. Hooke and Mr. Leger were never close. In fact, Mr. Leger caused Mr. Hooke a lot of trouble and Mr. Hooke took very strong exception to the things Mr. Leger did.

But the other instance you referred to, involving Dr. Allard: Dr. Allard at that time was a practicing physician. He was involved in corporate work, he had been for many years, but he was still a practicing physician in Edmonton, and he was Mr. Hooke's personal family doctor. Mr. Hooke's health was not too robust and he'd had a bit of trouble, and he'd gone to Dr. Allard as his family doctor. Dr. Allard, as I understand it, had said to him, "You really ought to get away for a bit of a break; you're tense and worked up." So he said, "Why don't you get out to the coast or get somewhere away from things for a week or two." I don't know what Mr. Hooke said, probably something to the effect that perhaps he'd do that but he didn't know what he'd do or something like this. Or whether he said, "I don't want to go to the cost of living at the coast for a while." Well, Allard said, "I have a condominium (or apartment) sitting there empty; we use it when we visit out at the coast. It's sitting there; go on out and stay there for a couple of weeks." This is his doctor talking to him.

So he went, and did this. That's all there was to it. Later on when there were some questions raised about Mr. Hooke's department or his activities, some newspaper people I think dug this up, and they put the two together and they said Allard was giving him free accommodation to get favours out of him. Well, it was a most unfair thing, because Dr. Allard was an extremely conscientious and good medical man, and he was just doing the guy a kindness by saying, "Look, there's an apartment sitting out there with nobody in it; if you and your wife are going out there for a week, go and stay in it. You're perfectly welcome to use it." Which he did. But the press tried to make a lot out of it.

LS: What was Tom O'Dwyer's role, and who was Tom O'Dwyer? He's been described a financier, as a land developer. He's sort of a mystery person. Who was he?

ECM: I don't think Tom O'Dwyer knew himself who he was! I don't know whether I ever even met Tom O'Dwyer personally. He was well-known in the sense he was rather notorious. At one time he ran for the Liberal Party in an election in Edmonton. He was defeated; the Liberals threw him out. He was a character assasin - it was his chief occupation on the sideline. He claimed to be a financier. I don't think he ever financed anything bigger than a peanut stand. He was a loud-mouthed guy that drank too much and got his joys out of life in assassinating people's characters.

I don't know what was his reason. He never had any dealings with the Government, to my knowledge, but he decided to launch a crusade. He decided everybody in the Government was crooked; that seemed to be the premise that he started from. It was his commission in life to get rid of the Government and do it by zeroing in on individual Ministers. And we had quite a rough time with him for a while. He was that type. He was one of the guys that promoted this stuff about Hooke using Allard's apartment. He read into that everything of the very worst.

He was always running to the newspapers, and of course they loved this kind of gossip. All you could really say was he was a ruddy nuisance; a couple of times he got pretty close to the line and some of the fellows wanted to sue him a few times. I always recommended against it because he didn't have anything and all he wanted was publicity. So we primarily ignored him, but he made a completely nuisance of himself.

I believe in some of the material you looked at you read an article by Hailey ...

LS: Yes, Arthur Hailey - an article for Maclean's.

ECM: Well, that came about as a result of Tom O'Dwyer's newspaper propaganda that Maclean's got hold of. Of course they thought, "Oh, there must be some scandal out in Alberta," so they wanted to get in on it.

I don't know whether I ever told you about this before, or whether it's even interesting enough to put on record, but I was rather amused afterward. Apparently Arthur Hailey, who was just becoming fairly well known as a writer in those days, was a close friend of the editor of Maclean's. My office got a call from Maclean's asking if I would be prepared to meet an Arthur Hailey. I must confess quite frankly, I didn't even know who Arthur Hailey was! I think he'd written a couple of books by that time, but I wasn't spending much time reading that type of fiction, and I didn't know who Arthur Hailey was. I thought it was just some reporter from Maclean's. I said, to heck with it. I had no interest in talking to anybody from Maclean's.

Anyway, whoever this was (the head man or somebody in <u>Maclean's</u> in Toronto) phoned my executive secretary and said, "I don't think the Premier understands. This isn't a reporter for <u>Maclean's</u>; this is Arthur Hailey the novelist, the writer, and he has consented to do a personal article on the Alberta Government and the Premier and so on. He's coming out to get background information to write this article, and we wanted him to see the Premier because he's going to write about him.

So my secretary came to me and explained all this and I said, "Well, if that's the case, I don't mind talking to him." So that's how I came to meet Arthur Hailey!

I found Athur Hailey quite a charming chap. He'd been out in Alberta during the War. He was in the Air Force, I believe, with the Commonwealth Air Training Program. Of course we had a big operation in Alberta. He loved this part of the country; he was very fond of it. He was of British background of course.

When he came out, we kind of laughed a bit. I said, "I'm sorry I turned down their request to see you. I thought it was just somebody from Maclean's magazine." I said, "If you're connected with Maclean's, you might as well know, I have absolutely no time or use for Maclean's, or any interest in anything they write." So he said, "Well, I understood that, but I want you to know my position. I have been asked by (ane he named this chap who was one of the head men at Maclean's, a personal friend) if I would take on this assignment. I don't do this kind of work; it's not my field. I finally, at his insistence, agreed to take it on on one condition, that not one word of what I write will be changed."

I had said, "I have no confidence in what goes into Maclean's; they'll muss it all up anyway, to colour it to their own..." He said, "That's the condition on which I undertook to write an article for them. So I'd like your cooperation in giving me some information, and it would be very helpful if you maybe mentioned it to your Ministers. I want to talk to a few of them."

That's how the Arthur Hailey visit came about. He spent a bit of time here. He went around and talked to a bunch of Ministers. He talked to this character O'Dywer, among others. He talked to Mr. Hindman whose resignation I'd asked for prior to this. He even went out and visited with my wife for a couple of hours to get the family background! And he wrote an article that I thought was a good article. I think he was objective; he was fair.

LS: That was interesting, because he did mention talking to the various Ministers, but also to your wife, and his impressions there, and some impressions of yourself.

ECM: I thought his article was kind. He had no reason; because it was the first time we'd ever met, and he was from outside, he could have written anything he liked. But my impression of Mr. Hailey in chatting with him - I guess I talked to him for maybe an hour, that's all I saw of him - was that he set a very high standard for himself in his work. I gather this

probably holds with his novels. He has a reputation for doing a tremendous lot of research before he writes. And the impression I got in talking to him was that he had no opinion one way or the other, and no interest one way or the other. He wanted to find out as many facts as he could, and then he'd try to put them together in an article, which is what he tried to do. I thought his article was quite kindly.

LS: It was a major article. Did that whole time - with Hindman, Hooke, O'Dwyer - come close to really shaking your Government, or not?

ECM: I would say it was more of a nuisance value. It was a difficult time because this stuff was being raised day after day, week after week, and of course the media were just like a bunch of bloodhounds. We were in those days (much more so than today), as a province, largely ignored by the Eastern press. But when O'Dwyer got on this bash of his to assassinate a few characters, the local media picked it up and had a field day on it. Then these characters started coming out from the East. I could be wrong on this, because I have no way of knowing it, but I remember the Toronto Star sending an investigative reporter - that's the trade name for a paid character assassin - out to interview us. And I remember observing to my Ministers at the time that it was rather an interesting thing - in all the years, the things we've been trying to do out here with all the energy stuff and everything, to my knowledge there's never once been a man from the Toronto Star come to find out anything. But a character like Tom O'Dwyer tries to stir up some scandal and assassinate a few characters, and they're on the doorstep like a bunch of bloodhounds the next day! And this was characteristic; and of course this is what was getting into the media.

There was another little incident that comes back to mind. I don't just remember the order of these things. We were talking about Mr. Hooke and Mr. Leger. Mr. Leger had a hotel over in south Edmonton in those days. I got a call from Mr. Hooke one night, and he was quite agitated, quite upset. He said he'd had a very disturbing experience and wanted to know if I could see him. So I said sure, come on to the house. (I'm not sure of the story; it's a long time ago and I've probably forgotten a lot about

it.) He had had a call, I think from Mr. Leger, wanting to see him. Mr. Hooke was a very accommodating fellow; he used to get himself into some problems sometimes because he was always accommodating everybody that called him and sometimes their motives were not the best. Anyway, however it worked out, he agreed to drop into Leger's motel on the south side on the way home, or something. When he got there, there was a reporter from the Edmonton Journal who'd been around covering the press gallery. If I remember correctly, Leger was there but he wasn't in the room, an this newspaper character went after Hooke, saying (he was working with O'Dwyer), "Now look, we've got the dope on three or four of your colleagues, and we're going to blow this thing wide open. We're going to wreck the Government. You can save your neck if you'll give us all the inside dope on these fellows. If you do, you'll not be included. If you don't, you will." It was straight blackmail!

Hooke was terribly upset by this and told the fellow to go jump in the lake, and went home and phoned me. So I phoned the editor of the Journal (he's now dead), I think the only time I ever phoned an editor in all the years I was in government. I knew this man, and I was quite sure he would not condone that kind of thing if he knew what was going on. I called him and said, "I'd like to tell you of an incident that happened tonight because it involves one of your men." I related this to him, and he was very exercised. They canned the reporter; this guy was just working on his own outside with Leger and a few characters like this. But it was quite a shaking experience for Mr. Hooke. He just put the blackmail to him and said, "If you'll give us all the dope on your colleagues that we can use, fine, otherwise you're going to be included in the bunch that we're going to clean out.

LS: It raises a horrible spectre, doesn't it?

ECM: Well, these things are a nuisance in government because you're preoccupied with a thousand and one important things and then you have to take your time to deal with this kind of stuff. It's an awful nuisance. It comes up from time to time; there's no way of avoiding it.