Mr. E. C. Manning
Interview #16
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LS: Before going into talking about some of the events and legislation of 1943, I'd like to continue talking about a current issue, the Alaska Highway Natural Gas Pipeline.

First of all, clarification about one of the things we talked about in our previous talk, regarding the development in the Mackenzie River Valley, and how in fact the current situation is tied into that. And secondly, your reaction to the decision that was made last night by the Federal Cabinet to go ahead with the pre-build portion of the pipeline; and the NDP threat (I suppose) of a filibuster on that issue.

ECM: The background of the Alaska Highway Gas Pipeline really goes back a long way. It became known, quite a number of years ago, that there was a substantial volume of gas in the Arctic areas and the Arctic Islands - and also oil - and from that time on there were ideas advanced for ultimately moving that gas to the areas where there were markets. The volume of Canadian gas in the region was really not sufficient in itself to make economic a pipeline of that magnitude.

Then when the Prudhoe Bay oil development in Alaska took place, and along with it increasing volumes of gas were found in Alaska, then the interest arose in the United States, to move that gas to the States south of the 49th parallel. It was a very obvious thing that people would think of rolling those two things together. If you were going to build a line to carry Alaska gas to the States, it was only reasonable to tie in with it, in some manner, sufficient capacity to move the Canadian gas. There would be no sense in building two lines which would travel over the same route for much of the distance.

This finally came to fruition in the proposal to build a pipeline. The initial proposal was called the Gas Arctic Project, put together by a consortium of oil and gas companies, with the idea of building a large

pipeline down the Mackenzie Valley, tapping the Canadian gas development from the Arctic Islands, with the line extended on to Prudhoe Bay and Alaska, which would pick up the American gas and bring it down through the same line. This consortium was quite a large group. I think at one time they had approximately 18 or 20 companies involved in it.

Incidentally, one of the participants in that project was Alberta Gas Trunk Line, who later withdrew from the consortium and put together the second project, which was the Alaska Highway Gas Pipeline that was finally approved.

The main opposition that developed to the Gas Arctic Project down the Mackenzie Valley was environmental objections. There was very strong exception taken to it by various environmental groups. They claimed that it was going to destroy the terrain in that whole area; it was going to interfere with the caribou herds which in turn had a bearing on the food supplies for the Inuit people in the region; and so on. This criticism from not a large number of people, but very vocal environmental groups, was such that the Federal Government finally set up what was known as the Berger Commission, to do an in-depth study of the impact of this proposed pipeline on the Arctic, the tundra, the native interests, and all the rest of it.

To my mind, the Berger Commission was a major mistake. It would have been far better if it had never been set up at all. This took place at the time when we had a minority Liberal Government in Ottawa, and they were being sustained in power by the NDP. And the NDP were the chief political advocates in opposition to the building of a pipeline down from the Arctic, particularly the Mackenzie Valley proposal.

It was the common belief (I think with a lot of justification) that while the Berger Commission with Justice Berger as Chairman was set up by the Federal Government, the selection of Justice Berger to head it was one of the conditions the NDP imposed on the Government to continue their support. Before he went on the bench, Berger had been a very active advocate of native rights, and was a socialist himself and was right in

line with the NDP philosophy. I think many people felt, as soon as that appointment was made, you might as well forget about any objective analysis of the project. It would be biased in favour of the environmental groups and the native groups.

The Berger Commission held hearings all over the North; it went on and on. The thing cost about 5 or 6 million dollars before it was finished. When they brought out the report, they recommended that no development take place for a 10-year "freeze" on the region, and voiced a very large number of objections to projects of this kind on the grounds of their adverse environmental impact.

The net result of it was pretty well to kill the acceptance of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline. Here you had a Commission set up by the Government, recommending first that the whole project be delayed, and secondly that the Mackenzie Valley route was terrible because it was going to have these adverse environmental effects. At the same time, you were asking the National Energy Board, another Government tribunal, to rule on the application for the project.

The reasons that I say I think the Commission was very unfortunate and it would have been better now to have it at all were, first of all, the result of it was delay. They put the development of the whole Arctic, and oil and other mineral development of the Arctic, back probably 10 years. The effects will continue to be felt for a long time.

Secondly, and the one that disturbed me the most, they built up among the native people wholly unrealistic expectations. To me, that was a cruel thing to do. We're seeing the consequences of it now, in the problems that have arisen in trying to come to settlement on land claims. The Berger Commission left the impression with the native people that they had every reason to anticipate that all these land settlements were going to be taken care of before there was any construction, and that the compensation would be such that it was completely unrealistic.

What disturbs me in it is that I think it's most unfair to build up false expectations in the minds of people who were not knowledgeable of the technology of building a pipeline - understandably they were not. A whole raft of do-gooders swarmed into the area when the Commission was there, and they were all representing the natives' rights. There were more native rights represented by people out of Toronto than there were out of the Arctic!

As I say, it built up these expectations, which will not be realized. What disturbs me is the result of the frustration and the disillusionment that is going to be there when time proves that so much of what the Berger Commission was talking about was completely unrealistic.

I think the delay in Arctic development occasioned by the Commission was also a very serious thing to Canada. In a period of inflation, with these very costly projects every year's delay adds not millions but billions of dollars to the ultimate cost - all of which is going to be borne by the consumers who buy the gas. So to that end it was very much against the interests of the consumers who ultimately will pay the bill.

However, before the Berger Commission came out with its report, in fact when it got under way, it was at that stage that a number of the members of the consortium had withdrawn. Most of the withdrawals up to that point, I think, had been by reason of the delays. They saw all this inquiry going to be held before any decision would be made on the line, and they just were not prepared to sit around for two or three years, which is what usually happens when you get that kind of inquiry under way.

Alberta Gas Trunk Line withdrew, but they put together a second proposal, avoiding the Mackenzie Valley, which they knew was the focal point of criticism by environmentalists. They proposed a different route altogether, providing for a spur line which later became known as the Dempster Highway line, to go over to tie in the Canadian gas into the line that they proposed to build from Alaska.

Their line initially was designed entirely with the idea of moving the Alaskan gas to the States, through Canada, but with a provision for a tie-in spur line to bring Canadian gas into the system.

Alberta Gas Trunk Line handled the thing very cleverly, from the standpoint of insuring that their project would have every prospect of approval. They had their men travelling around with the Berger Commission and establishing contacts with the native people. They gave great weight to what they were going to do to take care of native interests, and all these things, which probably had an effect, particularly in the light of the ultimate Berger report which zeroed in on those matters far more than on the technical and engineering aspects or financial aspects of building a pipeline.

As a result, the situation ended up with the National Energy Board having to make a choice between the two proposals which were then before it. Would they give approval to the Gas Arctic Project, to the Alaska Highway Pipeline Project, or neither of them? And their decision was in approval of the Alaska Highway Pipeline. So the other consortium disappeared; they dropped out. They'd spent well over $100 million on the thing. It was a very costly operation because it had gone on for years.

Then the Federal Government of course had to be deeply involved in this because it involved giving a right-of-way for a pipeline across Canada which would be carrying American gas.

Incidentally, when the National Energy Board gave its decision, they made as a condition of their approval, that the Dempster Highway connecting link be engineered and made a part of the Alaska Highway Project. Practically nothing, to my knowledge, has been done on that as yet, because the whole major project has been in abeyance ever since, from one obstacle after the other. Ultimately, if the approval of the Board is carried out, the Dempster Highway connection will have to be built. And until it is built, there'll be no Canadian gas from the Arctic coming into this system at all. It's entirely Alaska gas moving south through Canada.

I think it's going to be interesting to see what happens, as and when this

Dempster connecting line is built, or when they get to the place where they're prepared to build. I'm pretty certain that you'll find that practically all of the objections that were made to the Mackenzie Valley line will be made to the Dempster Highway line. It goes through approximately the same type of terrain. How that's all going to be worked out, only time will tell, but it isn't going to be a simple approval and "go ahead and build it". You can be quite certain there will be all kinds of environmentalists and people that are anti-Northern-development that are going to object to it. And the native land claims will be there with all the vehemence that was there on the Mackenzie Valley pipeline.

I mention that in this brief outline because it does have a definite bearing on when Canadian gas will start to move through that system. It won't start to move, as far as northern gas is concerned, until the Dempster connecting line is built. There's no other way to tie Canadian gas into it. The Canadian gas is not near where the line will come from Alaska. Those fields have to be connected to the pipeline by this Dempster connection.

Then the Canadian Government set up a Northern Pipeline Authority, headed by Mitchell Sharp, who years ago used to be the Finance Minister of the Liberal Government. He accumulated a staff around him, and they were charged with the responsibility of overseeing Canadian interests in the construction of the line through Canada to carry the American gas.

The proposal emerged out of the fact that large volumes of additional gas were being found in Western Canada. In fact, we have a very large surplus of gas in Alberta today, not only to our own Provincial needs, but to Canada's needs. We have literally hundreds of gas wells that are capped, with no production at all, because there's no market. The pressures were building up to get a temporary export market for that gas, until such time as further pipelines could be built, probably on to the Maritimes and the East to get this gas into Canadian markets. The Americans were anxious to get additional Canadian gas, and of course the gas producers were getting pretty desperate. particularly the little companies. The big ones could afford it. A few dozen capped gas wells were not a big factor in a

multinational oil or gas company. But if a little Canadian or Alberta company, that was only in the gas development business with very limited capital, had twenty wells (and it took a lot of capital to drill them in the first place) and then all they could do was screw a cap on the top of them when they finished them and there was no cash flow, of course they were in a very serious position. So they were very anxious for a market.

As a result of these two or three factors - the very large increase in volume of surplus gas, the need and demand for gas in the States, and the plight of the developers and producers (especially the small companies) - the idea evolved of having what they called a "pre-built section" of the Alaska Highway Pipeline. What this involved was (without waiting for the total line to be built) to pre-build a section in southern British Columbia and southern Alberta, which would tie in ultimately with the main pipeline when it comes down from Alaska. But in the meantime it would be tied into gas fields in the southern Alberta, and move some of this gas through the pre-built section to the United States in advance of the main line carrying American gas from Alaska.

The Canadian Government then passed legislation which spelled out, as a condition to approval of this pre-build, that they would have to be given full assurance that the American main line was going to be built. This was a prerequisite to any approval for the pre-build section. What they wanted to avoid, very understandably, was authorizing the pre-build section and then ending up with the other line not being built. All you'd have was another little gas system to take gas to the United States. We don't need that, just for that reason, because we have export lines to the States now. This was going to be an integral part, ultimately, of the Alaska Highway Pipeline, but in the meantime it would move some gas down to the States, give relief to the producers in Alberta that had no market, stimulate continued development of more gas, and also (because it would be done by the same groups that would be involved in building the main line) would be a factor in generating some cash flow that would help finance the main line.

Incidentally, when the proposal was first finalized before the National Energy Board, the total cost was estimated at 3 1/2 billion dollars. That's five years ago, and it has gone up and up and up until now it's 23 billion dollars. So the financing becomes a big problem.

In the last year there has been very strong pressure to get on with this pre-build. Finally, as far as 1980 is concerned, the Foothills group (the division sponsored by Alberta Gas Trunk Line which will be responsible for the construction of the Canadian section of the main project) advised the Federal Government that they had to have a decision by the middle of July of this year if any construction was going to take place this year. If the authorizations were not in place by then, it would be delayed at least another year.

This is what the Government has been wrestling with for the last six weeks. They've been trying desperately to get what they could say were adequate assurances from the United States with respect to the financing of the main project. This is where the argument came up in Parliament. The legislation certainly anticipated that these assurances would be assurances that the finances were in place to build the line.

It's become obvious they were not going to be able to get those assurances in their entirety, because the financing isn't in place. And when you talk about assurances that the financing is in place, it means that the whole financial arrangements have to be put together, and funds committed. And it is not to that place; the funds have not been committed. You have a lot of companies saying, "Yes, we'll put money into it." But nobody's put any dollars in the bank; there is no guarantee; something could still happen that they wouldn't do it.

So more and more, the Government in Ottawa has shifted from the absolute financial guarantee to political guarantees. They finally have obtained from Washington resolutions passed by both Houses of Congress, in which the American Houses said they are 100% behind this line, it's part of their energy program, it's an integral part of their whole planning, and it's their intention to see that it is built. It's not a light assurance; it

carries a lot of weight, but it still isn't money in the bank.

The debate came up in the Commons and in the Senate, "Is this an acceptable assurance that the total project is going to be built?" This would make possible the authorizing of the pre-build. Of course there has been a lot of disagreement. The Opposition have argued that this isn't an assurance at all. It's just a political thing. "Where are the financial guarantees that the thing is going to be financeable?" And of course, those are not available.

This last week they got to the deadline where they had to make a decision if there was going to be any construction this year. The Cabinet itself has had a real headache in trying to decide this, because the Cabinet was split on it. Some of the Ministers wanted to go ahead with the pre-build because it certainly has a lot of advantages to Canada. And some of them, who are sort of the negative-nationalist type, who are against <u>any</u> export of gas or Canadian resources to the States, just don't want it built, any of it.

When this was raised in the House to see if there was a final decision, in the last few days, they said they still had to have more time. And then just last evening, the Minister of Energy announced that now in addition to the Resolutions of the two Houses of Congress, they have received a letter from President Carter giving a firm commitment to the construction of the line. I don't know what's in that, that they didn't have before, except that it's in a letter and it's signed by the President. But again I point out, in passing, it's a political commitment. A letter from the President of the United States does not put a dollar in the bank for the pipeline.

Anyway, they accepted that as satisfactory evidence of the ultimate building of the line, and last night they gave approval in principle to the pre-build.

Personally, I think it's very vital to Canada's interests that that pre-build project go ahead. First, because without it there's going to be a slowdown in the program of exploration for further gas and oil resources

(because the two are tied closely together) which is the last thing we want in Canada at a time when we're trying to become more oil and gas self-sufficient, particularly oil self-sufficient.

As far as the small producing companies are concerned, as I've indicated, if the pre-build had not been authorized, quite a number, I'm sure, would have been out of business in another year. A few of them might have had to fold financially, but I don't think that would happen to many. What they would do is simply sell out their reserves to the multinational companies. And they'd have to sell them out at a "fire sale" price because they are desperate. They've got huge loans from banks, at high interest rates, and they've got to get money. It just means the difference between them remaining in the picture, or else being put out of business or forced to sell to cover their financial obligations.

The other reason why I feel this is so important to Canada is that one of the most serious problems we face as a country today is the terrible balance of payments deficit we have. It's going to get larger as time goes on, because we're importing more and more foreign oil at prices that are going up all the time. Our balance of payments deficit has become staggering. This proposed deal for the gas that will move through the pre-build section of the line, spread over quite a period of years, amounts to about $18 billion of sales to the United States. $18 billion is a very significant figure in helping to offset the very serious balance of payments picture we have in this country.

So Canada will gain from that. And we have to remember, when we say, "Canada will gain", every citizen gains from that kind of thing. The balance of payments problem is one of the things that's depreciating the value of our dollar, and that means that every citizen is the one that's paying the bill. It isn't the oil companies. It's the rank and file of people who are affected.

One of the results of the activity that will take place with the pre-build, I think undoubtedly will be the strengthening of the Canadian dollar. This isn't going to solve all Canada's economic problems - it's not that big a

thing - but it is going to have a positive impact on the Canadian dollar, which in turn will be money in the pocket of the citizen. It's of concern to every citizen, not just the development companies.

In my mind, this export of surplus gas should have been authorized long ago. We're at least a year and a half late in doing it, from the standpoint of the nation's interests, and I'm very pleased to see the authorization. Now, we can't get carried away with enthusiasm at this point, because in the light of experience with these things, there are still a lot of things that can go wrong. There are still a lot of snags that can be encountered. But at least we're over the big hurdle, as far as the initial approval of the Canadian Government is concerned.

LS: What sort of snags could develop? Political ones?

ECM: There can be political obstructions. You never know when various groups opposed to export are going to apply for injunctions on some ground. There can be actual problems you might run into in getting the materials, manpower, and financing for the pre-build section.

Another situation that is developing, that I think should be of concern to the Government of Canada, is that we're getting the price of our gas at the border so high that in the United States today there's growing concern about the economics of buying Canadian gas as compared with other kinds of fuel, such as generating energy from coal. They are moving very quickly in that direction.

Right now, for example, there's talk (I hope it's only talk) on the part of the Federal Government, of imposing another export tax on gas. If they should tack an export tax on top of the very high border price that the Americans have to pay for Canadian gas today, it's questionable whether that American market is going to be there or not. They may say, "Let's forget about Canadian gas. We can go down and buy it as cheap, or cheaper, in Mexico." Or, "We can generate our energy requirements by using thermal generation plants and generating electricity instead of using gas." These are the risks you encounter when you jack your price up so high that it

becomes uneconomic to import. I hope these things won't happen, but they're all risks, and they're all involved in whether this thing will be totally successful.

LS: One final question, a smaller detail. In the earlier part of the discussion on this, you mentioned Mitchell Sharp and his role in this area. What's happened to him?

ECM: He's still head of this Authority. They have a staff and an office, and they'll be in charge of the overall supervision of the total project, from the standpoint of protecting Canadian interests. That is, to see that everything is done to the specifications required, and in the manner required, and all the environmental conditions that have been laid down are met. That type of thing.

LS: Is Sharp suited for that?

ECM: Well, he's suited in the sense that he's had long years of experience in administration. He will not be making decisions on the technical things. They have a staff of about 100, which includes technical people, engineers, environmentalists, and so on.

LS: I was just interested in the fact that he was appointed to this particular job.

ECM: Well, it's a political appointment. But in fairness to Mr. Sharp, he's had long years of experience. Mr. Sharp started out under C. D. Howe in the War days, and he has a long background of experience. Certainly he knows the governmental aspects of administration, and he is merely the supervising head of the project. He had the technical people to do the technical work.

LS: One other question. Some portion of the country (and you alluded to them) have said that we should not be exporting any gas at all. I'm assuming that the reason is that we are going to need it eventually ourselves. Or is that part of their thinking? And that ties in with the fact that the

NDP Caucus is talking about a filibuster of this latest decision. What are your thoughts on that?

ECM: Of course, as far as the NDP is concerned, they've always been negative nationalists. They're anti-American. They're opposed to shipping anything to the States. They're for the socialization and nationalization of the petroleum industry. They want the Government of Canada to own it, control it, and keep it all in Canada. In my view this is completely unrealistic.

In all of Canada today, in round figures, we are using about 2.8 trillion cubic feet of gas per year. The figures produced before the National Energy Board (and the industry figures are higher yet), when you take the established reserves and what are regarded as the highly potential reserves - in other words, there is no real worry about whether gas is there, it just isn't yet tied in to the systems - you are talking about a figure in Canada today of probably over 100 trillion cubic feet. Allowing for the increase in Canadian consumption, taking all those factors into account, we have now 25 years' assured supply for all of Canada, plus a very healthy surplus. And this doesn't take into account any new gas that's found. And gas today is being found in very large quantities, in the Arctic and even in the older areas, with deeper drilling. The volumes are coming up very, very quickly.

It would not be unrealistic to assume that we have in Canada today probably gas supplies for our own needs for at least 30 or 35 years, plus a significant surplus on top of that, when you take into account even a minimum amount of gas being found in that 30 or 35 year period. It'll probably be far, far more than that. In the last number of years, with all the energy crunch, our gas proven reserves have been increasing, not decreasing. They've gone up far faster than we've been using them.

I think if you have a source of energy that will supply your people for 30-35 years and still have a surplus, it's in the interests of the country to market that surplus. First of all, because of this serious balance of payments situation. For anybody to say, "35 years from now, the country's going to be wholly dependent on gas," - by that time we may have forgotten

what gas is. Look back over the progress of technology and the changes of the last 50 years.

It becomes pretty unrealistic to say, "We're going to sit on this." You might just as well say the same thing of coal. We've got enough coal maybe for 300 years. But should we say, "We won't export any coal, because 300 years from now, people of that generation are going to need the coal." You could say the same think about nickle. Should we export any nickle from Canada? It's a very valuable commodity, and we've got the bulk of it. Should we sit on it because someday there isn't going to be any more nickle?

You can say that about any irreplaceable resource. And it becomes a matter of the volume in relation to the domestic demand for a reasonable period into the future. As far as gas is concerned, we don't need to worry.

LS: Maybe there are some other reasons then, for this stance?

ECM: Well, there are political reasons. One of the sad things in all of these situations is that such a large percentage of the political voices that raise these protests have absolutely no knowledge of what's involved in the gas industry. That's not their field. It's just a philosophy. "Let's keep what we have for ourselves." It's just that simple.

LS: We may return to this yet, and see what develops on it!

I'd like to move on to some of the events and legislation of 1943. But again, just prior to that, I want to refer to something that happened in 1941 and have your comments on it. That was the whole question of Mr. Aberhart's honorary degree from the university. The reason I'm raising it at this point is that I'm basing these questions on the unpublished memoirs of Robert Newton. He titled it, "I Passed This Way 1889-1964 Plus" - because I guess he thought there still might be more. He apparently was President of the University of Alberta during the Forties. He addresses this whole question of Mr. Aberhart's honorary degree.

I want to quote from these unpublished memoirs. Page 300, Mr. Newton writes, "Unfortunately, there was still much prejudice against Social Credit, and the Association of Teaching Staff discussed the matter rather hotly at its year-end meeting." He then goes on to say, on the same page, "Premier Aberhart would have been more than human not to feel annoyed at the turn of events. He eyed the University askance and felt that a Constitution which allowed the Senate to flout the wishes of the Board needed revision. He approached cautiously the selection of a new President."

Do you have any comments about that, what he said about Mr. Aberhart, not so much about his personal feelings, but rather about the University?

ECM: That was in a time when the University Act was under review, and certainly all of those aspects were looked at. I certainly couldn't say if the unfortunate experience of the honorary degree and the conduct of the University in that respect influenced Mr. Aberhart's feelings as far as what should be done in legislation was concerned. I have no reason to think it would, but I have no way of knowing to what extent those things could have influenced him.

Certainly that whole incident focused public attention on the University, and the structure of the University. I know a lot of the rank and file of people were saying, "How is it possible, when a Committee of the University, including its President, recommends a degree, how is it possible that some little group can come along and say, 'We ignore the whole thing. We're not going to permit it.'" Certainly the people were questioning what kind of a structure we had that permitted that, and it was on the minds of the Government as well.

LS: It's been suggested in some places that in fact the Government and Cabinet considered closing down the University in reaction to that.

ECM: No, there's no truth in that whatever. It was never even thought of.

LS: In the Glenbow in Calgary, there are memoirs of a gentleman called J.E.A.

MacLeod, who was on the Board of Governors of the University here during this period of time. He was a Liberal, a lawyer by profession, and in his memoirs he takes credit for leading the "no" vote against Mr. Aberhart. Did you know Mr. MacLeod?

ECM: Not that I can recall.

LS: Was there any interest in who were the "no" voters?

ECM: Oh, there was at the time. Frankly, I couldn't tell you the names of any of them now!

LS: One final thing on this. In Mr. Newton's memoirs, he says, in talking about some of the individuals involved (page 302): "Mr. H.H. Parlee, K.C., had been appointed Chairman of the Board of Governors the year before, and now became Chairman of the Survey Committee", the Committee being the one that was set up to look at the University. He then goes on to say the following about Mr. Parlee: "He was a striking individual, brisk and stimulating to meet, forceful in his utterance. Premier Manning said to me once, 'I always get a bang out of the Chairman.' He was impatient of time-wasting, and his emphatic 'Thank-you' had a finality which silenced loquacious witnesses at Survey hearings."

Did you say that about him?

ECM: I probably did. He was a very fine fellow. I liked Mr. Parlee. He was a prominent Edmonton lawyer. He took a great interest in the University, and took on the work there very readily. He was brisk, but a very pleasant fellow. He was a man that people liked; he had a nice personality.

LS: Another source has said that at this period of time, in reaction to the withdrawal of the honorary degree for Mr. Aberhart, both Mr. Kerr (who was President) and Mr. Parlee, offered letters of resignation. But that apparently they met with Mr. Aberhart, who said, "Look, both of you can't quit at the same time." The other factor in this was also that Mr. Kerr was near retirement age. Were you part of those discussions, or do you

know what occurred upon the receipt of the resignation letters of both these individuals?

ECM: I wasn't party to the discussions, although of course this was brought into Cabinet. What you've said is exactly what happened. They both tendered their resignations in protest against the action that had been taken.

Mr. Aberhart and the Government, and I think the University people as a whole, didn't want to see both of these men retire. It would be a very, very serious disruption of the University. As far as Mr. Kerr was concerned, he was adamant. There was no question, he felt he could do none other than resign. Mr. Parlee finally was persuaded to withdraw his resignation, and he did so very reluctantly. He wanted to resign too.

LS: I'd like to move on to another issue that we discussed briefly, and point out something that was covered in the Edmonton Bulletin of March 18th, 1943, in regard to the Japanese in Alberta.

It was a very interesting quote by Mayor Davison who was the Independent from Calgary. Apparently there had been a ban against certain persons of Japanese origin, in terms of allowing them into Alberta beer parlours. Does that ring a bell?

ECM: No, I don't recall that at all. Whether there was some special provision by the Liquor Control Board, I don't recall it.

LS: Well, according to this article, there was, and at a certain point Mr. Low, as Minister responsible, lifted the ban, saying that was restricting the rights of certain Canadian citizens. But what I find interesting in the article is the comments attributed to Mr. Davison. This is a quote from that article. "He asked for reasons for the change in the regulations, in view of the fact that there was a severe shortage of both beer and hard liquor in Alberta. The Mayor also asked if any consideration had been given to the possible demonstrations which might ensue if Japanese did enter a beer parlour."

That seems quite extraordinary.

ECM: I think too it's probably a bit extreme. I don't know about the shortage of beer at all. As I mentioned in our earlier conversations on these Japanese who were moved in here from the West Coast, they were law-abiding, quiet people.

There was naturally some resentment, on two grounds. One, you can't have an influx of a couple of thousand people into any community without people getting exercised. It doesn't matter whether they're citizens or non-citizens, native or non-native. That's natural. And then you also have to view this in the context of a bitter War. They were being moved because it was felt that some of them were enemy aliens. So the sentiment towards the possible enemy alien element in their midst was there. I suppose this is the type of thing that could be in the back of Davison's mind, but he was a colourful character and I would write 90% of that off as a political speech, and 10% as having some validity!

LS: Was he a beer drinker?

ECM: I don't know!

LS: Another reference around this time, in the newspapers, is to the continuing discussion on the Treasury Branches, the Treasury Branch estimates. But in one of these, Mr. Fallow refers to "Mortgage Loan Banks". Do you know what they were, and what was the issue there? It was a federal piece of legislation that was passed, and then Mr. Donald Gordon came across Canada promoting the idea of the Mortgage Loan Banks.

ECM: That's very vague in my mind, but as I recall it, I think that was an effort by the Government of Canada to provide an additional source of mortgage funds. Mortgages were a real problem, of course, everywhere, in those Depression years. People just couldn't give the security that was required, and they didn't have the assurance of jobs to pay the things off.

As I remember it, I think the Federal Government moved into that field (not to a large extent) and provided some funds for mortgages. I believe this is what Mr. Fallow was referring to.

LS: Mr. Fallow - at least as he was reported in the Edmonton Bulletin of March 22nd - made quite a long speech about this. But here is a quote that I'd like to read into the record and have your reaction to, especially if you know where it came from. Apparently this is what Mr. Fallow said. He quoted the following, and I think it's a Biblical quote: "Poor deluded phantom worshippers, know ye then what money is. 'Tis but a shadow of a reality, the substance of which has evaded you through your vainful worship of the shadow." Does that ring a bell? It goes on to say, "As your sires before you believed in the divinity of kings, so you, their children, believe in the divinity of metals. You have hewn for yourselves an idol from out the rocks, and bowing down before it have proclaimed it creator."

Do you know where that's from?

ECM: Well, it's not a Biblical quotation. I remember the quotation; I've heard it a number of times. Frankly, I don't know where it originated.

Mr. Fallow was a very colourful speaker, and given to using very descriptive phrases. He loved that type of description of the money powers. But I don't know where that originated. I've heard it quoted a number of times over the years, especially in those old days when monetary reform was a very prominent thing.

LS: One final small point. Apparently Mr. L. D. Byrne was still in Alberta at this time, because he spoke to the Public Accounts Committee investigation into the Treasury Branch system. This was the Mr. Byrne who had come out as part of Major Douglas's interest here. I'm interested in why he was still in Alberta. Apparently he was on the payroll of the Government of Alberta. And eventually what happened to Mr. Byrne?

ECM: When the Social Credit Board was abolished, we set up at the same time a new department of Government called the Department of Economic Affairs.

This was during the War, and they were given quite a number of responsibilities in connection with the post-War reconstruction planning. And also they took on any work that the Social Credit Board had been doing up to that time.

Mr. Byrne was appointed Deputy Minister of the Department of Economic Affairs, and he served in that capacity for quite a number of years. It would be in that capacity that he would be appearing before the Public Accounts Committee.

LS: And did he continue to live in Alberta?

ECM: Yes, I think he's still in Alberta. I don't remember how many years he was in Government. His resignation ultimately was requested, because of a disagreement on policy, and then he became the British Trade Commissioner in Edmonton for years. I haven't heard from him for several years, and I assume that he certainly would be retired. As far as I know, he's still here. I haven't heard of him for at least five years.

LS: I want very briefly to cover three small areas before getting into the Provincial-Dominion relationships on labour.

First of all, in the Bulletin of March 12th some charges are made by a new Member of the House, Elmer E. Roper, of the CCF. You're smiling! He made a charge that there was a monopolistic control of the Vermilion oil field. I'm unclear about the issue. I'd like your comments on that particular issue, if in fact there is one. And secondly, on Mr. Roper. He was in the House for some time, wasn't he?

ECM: Yes. He became what in those days was the CCF leader in Alberta, and was elected to the House for several terms, I don't remember just how many. They never had more than 3 members, or maybe 4 at one time but that was at the very outside. He was a very aggressive man, a very capable man. He was a typical socialist - or he wouldn't have been in the NDP.

LS: What does that mean?

ECM: I mean, he was all for public ownership of industry, and public ownership of just about anything that they wanted to own.

The criticism of the oil industry in the field was quite in line with their philosophy. They were opposed particularly to American companies having a place in the development of Canadian oil resources. And they have never changed their position on that, both Federal and Provincially. They have been consistent. They're very much opposed to what they call multinational companies.

Mr. Roper was a very capable leader, and a high-calibre individual. I had a lot of respect for Mr. Roper. We disagreed politically, but he was a good man. He was ultimately defeated in an election, I forget what year it was. I suppose from their standpoint it was quite ironic. He made a very concerted drive throughout the Province to try and improve their fortunes. He ran in Edmonton, but he was away from Edmonton practically the whole campaign because he was working throughout the rest of the Province. And as a result, he was defeated in Edmonton! And he dropped out as far as Provincial politics was concerned. He later became mayor of Edmonton, and served as Mayor for a number of years.

LS: Do you recall who was the head of CCF before him, in Alberta?

ECM: No, I frankly don't.

LS: Was Chester Ronning head of the CCF?

ECM: He had been active in the CCF away back before our Government came into office. But to the best of my knowledge, I don't think Mr. Ronning was involved after we came in. He made have been, to some limited extent. He was not in the House. He went into the diplomatic field, and made a career of the diplomatic service.

The CCF were not a factor in Alberta, because they never had more than one to three Members in the House.

LS: Another reference was made in this period of time to the fate of Government

House. What was happening to it? The structure was still standing. In 1937 it did not become the Lieutenant-Governor's home. What was happening during these years?

ECM: It was closed in 1937, and then shortly after the outbreak of War the Federal Government asked to take over Government House (it was turned over to them for $1.00 a year, or something like that) for the use of veterans. It was sort of a veterans' hospital, not an active treatment hospital, but a convalescent hospital. It was redone in the interior for that purpose, and served that purpose for years, until quite a while after the War it was turned back to the Province.

LS: During these years it was used for that?

ECM: That's right.

LS: During this period of time, February-March 1943, you made a speech to the Edmonton Social Credit Constituency Association, about something called the Beveridge Plan of social security, which I understand was a British plan. What was it, and why did you consider it important enough to make a speech about it?

ECM: Beveridge was regarded as the "father" of the British welfare state. He was a learned socialist who believed in welfare from the cradle to the grave. In fact, that's what the Beveridge Plan used to be called: Social Welfare from the Cradle to the Grave. It covered everything from infant care through to the burial of the aged after they died.

Particular in those days, when socialism on a national scale was not that common, and in Britain particularly, this was quite a radical thing. It was given worldwide attention; it was by far the most comprehensive and, in many respects, radical, state welfare program of any major country up till that time. I would refer to it in the context of the trend towards socialism which we were bucking, and used it as an example of what the situation is when the state takes over the works.

LS: This raises an issue that isn't unique to this period of time. Sometimes when you look at some Social Credit legislation, for instance some of the things that Dr. Cross was responsible for (medical care that would be universal to people in Alberta) and then you think about things that might have been in the Beveridge Report - some of the things that a socialist philosophy would also advance as legislation - they are not always greatly dissimilar.

Where do they become different? How, in your view, are they similar and dissimilar? I know it's a very broad question, but rather an important one. Sometimes when you look at both, you see that they're not all that different in terms of their intent.

ECM: As far as objective is concerned, I think that would be true in respect to a number of programs of that kind. Incidentally, some of these programs of our Government were attacked by our own people on the grounds that it was too much state involvement in these areas.

The line between a complete social welfare state, particularly in the field of social services, and a position where governments are doing what the majority at least would agree must be done by government, is not a clear line. You can't just draw a line and say, "On this side it's socialism; on this side it isn't."

Our basic philosophy first of all was very humanitarian. The whole concept of Social Credit was that the individual was the most important unit in society, not society collectively. This was probably the first big philosophical difference between our approach and the socialist approach. The socialist approach tends to deal with society collectively - the people. Our primary emphasis was on the individual, not the masses. If you looked after the individual, the masses would take care of themselves. That's a fundamental differences from the starting point.

The Beveridge Plan, for example, was a universal plan. Whether people needed the assistance, whether they were able to care for themselves, was not the point. The state did it. The people paid the taxes, and the state

provided the services, across the board. The universality concept. We opposed that concept, on the Canadian Health Insurance Plan, and things of that kind. Our approach was that the state was responsible to see that those who were unable to provide for themselves were cared for. But that if the individual was capable to caring for himself, that was his responsibility. This again is a fundamental difference between the socialist philosophy and the philosophy that we pursued.

This type of thing came up very clearly in the very strong opposition we put up, and some other Provinces did, to the original medicare program in Canada. We had a medicare program in Alberta; we had an insurance plan, and in the case of those whose financial position was such that they simply couldn't afford it, the Government paid 100% of the premiums. There were two or three shades of this: I think at the lowest we paid 100%, then there was 60% and 40%, or 25%, and beyond a certain income level they paid their own. This was our approach to it. It was predicated on the premise that the state's responsibility was to care for people who were unable to care for themselves. But if they could care for themselves, that was their responsibility.

The Beveridge, and the universal plans of welfare, approached it from the standpoint that "we're going to do this for the masses", society collectively. Our approach was to the individual. Can this individual look after himself? Has he the physical capabilities, the training capabilities? If he can, that's his responsibility. If he can't, then by all means, as a group we'll look after him.

LS: The next large area that I'd like to move into is that of Dominion-Provincial relationships during the War, largely concerning labour policy. There are a couple of things. One was the War labour policy of the Dominion Government in terms of wage control orders and that kind of thing. They also apparently addressed the whole issue of American projects in Canada, and whether Canadians could or should work on these. And I know that the Social Credit Government in Alberta was concerned with that, and you in particular because of the Ministry that you were

responsible for.

The second area that's connected to that is the whole question of labour boards. You were Chairperson of the Alberta Regional War Labour Board, and I'm interested to know what its mandate was. Why did Dr. Robinson of Medicine Hat, a Social Credit Member, at one point urge that you relinquish this position? He seemed to feel there was some confusion between being Minister of Trade and Industry and also being on this War Labour Board.

ECM: This is an area that again you have to assess in the context of the nation being at War. Manpower became a very seriour problem, with thousands of men enlisting and going into the Armed Forces, and then all the auxiliary services of Armed Forces support which took up a great many more. Canada as you know made a remarkable transition in industrial areas, from peacetime industry to wartime industry, and I think a great deal of credit for this has to go to C. D. Howe who was the man in charge of that federally.

That meant that the great demand in the country was for industry that was related directly or in some way to the War effort. Then you were faced with the question of how you operate the rest of the economy. You've still got to have transportation, stores, merchants, and all the rest. The Federal Government moved into this field of Manpower Boards and supervisory boards for that purpose. It was a matter of allocating manpower to the highest priority categories of work, where the men were needed most, always with the War effort being the number one priority.

It was quite proper for the Federal Government to be very active in that field. Under the War Measures Act, they were responsible and had jurisdiction over the entire economy. Anything that had relation to the War effort.

In the Provinces, this did create problems, of course. Any disruption in what you might call "non-War" activities, industries, or employment, fell on the doorstep of the Provinces. We, and I think most of the other Provinces, in conjunction with the Federal activity, set up the Regional

Boards, which were primarily to coordinate the supervision and allocation of manpower within the Province with the national policy which was controlled under the War Measures Act by the Federal Boards.

The jurisdiction and role of these bodies was quite broad and flexble. Primarily it was a coordination role. It wasn't a matter of "This is our compartment, and that's your compartment". We had a national problem which affected the Provinces as well as the country as a whole. And as far as labour was concerned these Provincial boards were to try and coordinate the decisions and directives of the national board to the Provincial interests and requirements.

On the point that you mentioned about Dr. Robinson, I do recall that briefly. I was Minister of Trade and Industry, with responsibility for the industrial growth of the Province and encouraging that kind of growth, and at the same time was serving on a Board which was really for the allocation of manpower, coordinated with a national policy. And he felt (and I guess there were some grounds for this) that it was pretty hard to draw a line as to where your responsibility for one stopped and the other one started.

But here again, you wouldn't do those kinds of things under a normal peacetime economy. But under the pressures and needs of wartime, any problems there were in that regard were never considered serious. You just did the best you could in both roles, and that was it. Somebody had to do it.

LS: You were instrumental in the preparation of a brief that went to the Federal Government about the Wage Control Order. The newspapers reported that you have concerns about the provision about American projects in Canada, and who could work on those, and in fact, should there be a blanket wage control? I think you made the point that there were some people that that shouldn't apply to. Do you recall?

ECM: Yes. What I do recall is that we had a particular concern in that regard. There was quite a bit of American activity in this part of the country,

during that War period, in oil exploration. We weren't into the big league until 1947, after the War, but as I've mentioned in our earlier talks, with the discovery of crude on the flanks of Turner Valley in 1939 and the tremendous pressure to get more production because of the War requirements, there was a lot of activity.

We were encouraging that activity, and much of it was being done by companies that were subsidiaries of American companies. The question came up Federally, I guess, initially: With this great shortage of manpower, if you had to curb the availability of manpower for any industries, where did you start? And one of the proposals of course was, the foreign companies operating in the country. They'd be one of the lower priorities.

In general, that might not be anything very serious, if they were running a store, or something like that. But in our case, it was the exploration and development of mineral resources, and oil. So we were very anxious that that exploration and development not be retarded. In fact, our argument to them, as I recall it, was that in Canada's national War interest, it was vital that that type of thing not be interfered with. You shouldn't say, "You can't work for an American subsidiary", it that company is out hunting for oil, which was the thing that this country needed so desperately.

LS: Did they change that provision?

ECM: I don't recall. My general remembrance of that time is that it was a very flexible arrangement. And the cooperation between the two levels of government was good. When these problems arose, we'd sit down together and say, "Here's the way this is working out. Here are the problems it's going to create." And usually we could work out something. I don't recall any cases where there was confrontation over it. It was a matter of presenting the problems and possible solutions to them, and then arriving at some consensus as to what was the best thing to do.

Another area where I recall that type of thing was fairly common was the rationing of fuel. All gasoline was rationed in those days; there was a national Fuel Controller, Mr. Cotterell, that I've referred to before. He

had representatives in all the key points across Canada who were responsible for the local rationing. You got your tickets to buy gasoline, and they were allocated there.

There was a constant dialogue going on between the Provinces and Ottawa, and even in the municipalities, on the criteria for the allocation of these gasoline coupons. This was understandable. In anything like the requirements of gasoline for travel, it's almost impossible to just make a general category, and say everybody in that can get so much, and everybody in another category gets something else. There are too many variables.

My office did a lot of work on that, and we had a very close liaison with the local man in charge of fuel allocation for the Federal Fuel Controller. The man in Alberta was a man by the name of Dyck. He did a very excellent job, and had an office in Edmonton. We used to go down and talk to him repeatedly. There would be some type of work that required gasoline for trucks, or again it could tie in with the geophysical work for the oil industry, and if a problem arose because they didn't have enough to keep on doing the work, you'd go in and talk to the local ration allocator and get some variation in the regulations.

The regulations were very broad and flexible, for the very reason that you can't pour everybody into one or two categories when you're dealing with things like energy.

LS: The final thing that I'm interested in is how the Federal Government allocated war industry, and the predominance of development in the East (Quebec and Ontario) and not so much in the West. At this point you're reported as having prepared a brief. The Edmonton Bulletin of March 10th, 1943, refers to it.

The use of manpower is interesting. Apparently the Federal Government at this time actually proposed that manpower be transferred from the West to the East, and you said there were lots of problems with that, including where industry would develop in the post-War period. Secondly, the transfer of women from the West to the East was impractical for certain

reasons. And there were other things, but you also said "that there was a serious psychological reaction in the West to the tendency to centralize all War industry in Eastern Canada." What are your comments on that?

ECM: What you've described there is really the wartime setting of the age-old problem in this country of where industrialization should be concentrated.

The Federal Government's position was that under the pressures of war effort, the East was where most of the industry was located. It was where the large factories were located, where they already had the industrial potential. You could convert a factory over to war materials; the big structure was already there; they had the trained personnel. Whereas, if much was going to be done in Western Canada, you were starting from scratch. We didn't have those industries.

Their attitude was, "This is no time to start from scratch with industries. Let's take the ones that have the experience and have the facilities, and get cracking on producing the things we need for the war."

We said, "That's fine. But don't carry that to such extremes that you're going to deprive the rest of Canada of economic growth during this period." There was going to be growth because they were pushing for growth. "Don't concentrate it all in Ontario and Quebec, not only because it's not an appropriate thing to do now, but the effects of that after the War will be very serious. We already have a concentration of industry in Central Canada." We didn't want to see them do anything unnecessary to increase that still further, and then come into the post-War period when we were going to be faced with finding jobs for thousands of men coming back from overseas, and no industry to absorb them because the industrial expansion that had taken place in Central Canada would be such that it could look after all Canadian needs and you wouldn't need any more in the West.

So we were pretty exercised about it. And all of those submissions that you speak of were predicated on that thing. We went along with the concept. Let's get the War materials produced. But surely in an operation of this kind there are spin-off industries that can just as easily be in

Saskatchewan or Alberta or British Columbia as in Ontario or Quebec. But even then (and as I've said, it's part of the age-old problem in Canada) the old Economic Policy of this country going back to Macdonald was predicated on an industrial heartland, where industry protected by tariff would thrive, with a hinterland that would supply the raw materials and buy the products.

We didn't intend even then to stay "hinterland" all our lives, and we didn't want to see anything unnecessarily done, even during wartime, that would aggravate that problem after the War.

LS: Just to add to that, I would like to read into the record a quote from the newspaper that comes from your brief: "The volume of war contracts allotted to the three Western Provinces of Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Alberta combined is only about 6% of the total Canadian expenditure. Whereas almost 80% of the total expenditure has been allotted to industrial plants in the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec."

ECM: That's just typical of the thing we've been speaking of, the complete concentration of industrial growth in the central parts of Canada. In fairness, I recognize the wartime reasons for doing it.

But what we were concerned about - and I think with just cause - was that it wasn't wholly the wartime pressures. There was the influence of the Eastern industrialists who were powerful and established, and of course in the Commons where the decisions were made, all the rest of the country was outvoted by the representatives of the two central provinces. The Government could be quite assured that it could get support for locating anything in Ontario and Quebec, as far as the House of Commons was concerned. All the Western Members, voting against it, would still be outvoted by the two central provinces.

LS: It hasn't changed much.

ECM: It hasn't changed very much.

LS: I'd like now to talk about some of the specific legislation of 1943. I'd like to start with a piece of legislation regarding post-War reconstruction. Apparently there was an Alberta Committee on Post-War Reconstruction also.

ECM: Yes. The Act you referred to is the Act to provide for setting up of a fund to aid in post-war reconstruction. It was called the Post-War Reconstruction Fund Act. But prior to that, there had been an Act called the Post-War Reconstruction Act passed, and under that Act a Post-War Reconstruction Committee had been established. That was a joint committee, chaired by a Cabinet Minister, with a couple of other Ministers on it, some senior public servants, and some people from outside.

LS: Were you on that?

ECM: I was on it part time. The chairman was Eldon Tanner, who was our minister of Mines and Energy at the time.

This Committee was to plan, as far as it was possible to plan, for what the post-war needs would be, and how we were going to be prepared for the men coming back, to integrate them into the economy and into society.

The Post-War Reconstruction Fund Act simply provided a fund of $1 million, out of which this Committee's activities were financed. But the main thing in this Act, and as I recall the thing that really gave rise to it being passed at that time, was that in the work of the Committee (which had been operating before this Act, for some time) we knew that quite a number of the boys coming back from overseas, in this Province, were boys who'd enlisted from the farms. They were interested in agriculture, and if they had a preference would probably choose to go into agriculture.

So we worked out a program for making farmland available to veterans in the Peace River block in the north. It was quite a large program. And in conjunction with that, we recognized that there had to be roads put into the area to give access to towns and markets. In this Act, one of the provisions is that they could spend the funds for "such public works and

enterprises including the construction of roads and public buildings, and land settlement projects, which in the opinion of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council would be advantageous to the rehabilitation of these men." That, as I recall, was the main thing on which most of that money was spent.

We did settle quite a number; we gave them a half-section of land for practically nothing. They had quite an extensive program of tying these farmlands into communities with roads, and some help in getting at least some building facilities, to get them into the farming business. Also the provision of equipment, or helping them get equipment.

LS: Was the Government correct in gauging that this interest was there? Did a lot of servicemen take advantage of the program?

ECM: I can't recall the actual number. There was a substantial number. I think there were as many as we were able to take care of, from the land standpoint. The program, I would have to say in retrospect, turned out to be only partially successful. That area was not highly developed at that time in many respects, and a number of them didn't make it. Some did, and certainly there was a warm response to it when they came back.

It was a chance for those who were interested in farming to get a half-section of pretty good land for practically nothing. But the problems that we faced were the inevitable ones. They settled there, and then their families came along and there were the school problems and the hospital problems. The tendency, with the passage of time, for some of them, was to give up farming, sell their land to somebody else, and move into the urban centres.

On the whole I think it was a good program, but its long-range results were limited by virtue of the fact that what people think they'd like to do at the time when they came back was not necessarily what they wanted to do after 10 years of experience in it.

LS: Some of the other legislation, then. The Act Respecting Welfare and Conditions of Labour. What were its provisions?

ECM: It was quite a comprehensive bill. It covered the whole field of labour, and dealt primarily with working conditions. There was a whole list of provisions that it covered, such things as safety requirements, accommodation for people eating meals in plants, prohibiting them having to eat in places where there were toxic wastes, and all that kind of thing. It was very general, but it covered the whole broad spectrum of working conditions, and provided for inspectors to check plants to see that the regulations governing these working conditions were observed.

As I say, there was no single thing you could put your finger on and say, "These were the big things." It was an attempt to improve the general working conditions of people, particularly in factories or manufacturies centres, although it was brough enough to cover the whole spectrum of industries.

LS: And you were the Minister responsible for it?

ECM: That's right.

LS: With a piece of legislation like that, did you look to other Canadian experiences?

ECM: We'd get any other legislation of this type that was in effect in Canada. But the need for this kind of thing just grows out of your own experience and the growth of the Province. We had legislation, for example the Factories Act. I think this replaced the Factories Act. It was a rather primitive piece of legislation. It was passed in the days when there were practically no factories. But when you had more growth and industrial employment, the conditions under which people worked became a matter of concern. This updated the legislation, and at the time it was regarded a s a very advanced piece of legislation.

LS: Another piece of legislation was an Act to Regulate the Operation of Schools During the War Period. Although this is not a piece of this legislation, I'm interested in the whole issue of when the Japanese came to Alberta, who in fact paid for their entrance into schools, or other such situations?

ECM: I think I indicated in one of our earlier conversations, the Japanese were moved inland by order of the Federal Government. They assumed the financial responsibility.

I couldn't say that all of the costs were borne by the Federal Government. I know there were arguments that went on for quite a long time, over where you draw the line - some things which they felt would be quite appropriate for the Province to provide, that they would have provided for anybody coming in, they would argue should be borne by the Province. But as a basic principle, they accepted the basic responsibility for the financial costs, including education.

LS: Even though education is a provincial...

ECM: Yes. It was due to the fact that these people were there by virtue of an arbitrary act of the Federal Government; it wasn't a normal situation.

The legislation you refer to, governing the operations of schools: quite frankly I don't recall to what extent this legislation was ever actually used. I think it was probably to rather a limited extent, as far as some of its provisions were concerned.

For example, it provided a change in the school holidays so that the school term would begin on the 1st of March and end on the last day of February, instead of September. This again was tied in with the labour situation, the utilization of the schools throughout the summer months. It was more economic, for one thing, to operate schools in the summer, than it was in the winter. Better to have the holiday in the winter months when you didn't have to keep the schools open and burn the fuel, and all this kind of thing.

I don't recall to what extent that was used. But that's the type of provision that was in it. There were also some more general provisions with respect to teachers' contracts. One thing, for example (and this was the first time it was made law in Alberta), was that teachers' salaries were to be paid on a 12-month basis. Prior to that they were not paid

during the two holiday months. Their year was a 10-month year. This didn't affect the amount of the salary, but instead of paying it in 10 installments with no income during the holiday months, it provided that their salary would be paid on a monthly basis.

LS: That's still the case, isn't it?

ECM: Yes. That was the start of it and it was never changed after that.

LS: The Act for the Assistance of Debtors.

ECM: This was a replacement for the Debt Adjustment Act. The main difference was that the Debt Adjustment Act set out situations under which debts could not be collected, where foreclosures could not be taken, and so on. The Debtors' Assistance Act provided for setting up a Debtors' Assistance Board, and this Board was really an advisory, almost a counselling, service for debtors.

If a person had a mortgage or any kind of a debt that they were unable to pay, they could make application to the Debtors' Assistance Board. They would sit down and get all the particulars of their financial position and their debts. Usually it wasn't a matter of one debt. They might have a mortgage, they might have debts owing to half-a-dozen creditors.

The Board would get all this information, then call the creditors in and spread the whole thing out, saying, "These people can pay only so much. Can we work out an arrangement?" Maybe it meant extending the period of time in which the debt would be paid. Maybe in some cases it might mean a discount for cash, or something of that nature. They would work out settlements.

It was a very successful thing, and was continued for years and years. In fact, I think there's still a semblance of this structure in existence. It had the advantage of being able to deal with each case on its own merits instead of trying to pour them into a common mold. In some cases, the Board would say to the debtor, "Look, you haven't a case at all. You're

able to pay this. If you budget your income in a little different way, you can take care of it." It wasn't a matter of creating an opportunity for people to get out of legitimate debts, but to deal with actual cases of hardship.

As I recall the experience of that Board over a long number of years, on the whole creditors are pretty reasonable. All they want is their money, and it's better for them to say, "Sure, I'll stretch the repayment period a couple of years," if that meant getting it, as opposed to taking some precipitous action that would probably put the person into bankruptcy.

LS: That was fairly innovative for its time?

ECM: It was. I think there were other provisions of this kind in some areas across Western Canada particularly, but it was new as far as Alberta was concerned. And it was very successful.

LS: There were two pieces of legislation at this time too, regarding land. One is an Amendment to the Provincial Lands Act, and the second is an Amendment to the Land Sales Prohibition Act. What were their provisions?

ECM: The Lands Act had to do primarily with natural gas leases. Much of the land which was taken under exploration and geophysical permits was Crown land. We didn't have to deal with the private land; if it was private land they would go and deal with the surface owner. This Act spelled out a lot of conditions on spacing of wells and when they had to build, and the same with respect to mines, on Crown land that was leased for mineral development purposes.

The Act to Amend the Land Sales Prohibition Act tied in with the previous one which prohibited enemy aliens and Hutterites, the ones named, from buying land during the War. What this one did was also prohibit them from long-term leases. It was found that when they couldn't buy the land they were getting around the Act by making a deal for what on the surface was a lease, but which in many cases was a lease with the option to buy. It nullified the effect of the other Act. The Amendment simply included

leases as well as purchase.

LS: Another piece of legislation was introduced as a Private Member's Bill, and that's the Act Respecting the Trustee Board of the Presbyterian Church in Canada. I'm interested in the provisions there, but more importantly, in the larger question of why there would be this kind of legislation regarding the Presbyterian Church and perhaps some of the history or background.

ECM: Very briefly, the background is that way back in the late Twenties (perhaps it started in the mid-Twenties and in some cases even before that) there was a movement on the part of the Methodist Church in Canada and the Presbyterian Church in Canada to unite. It was called the Church Union Movement. This went on over quite a number of years. Some of the churches were very much for it, some were very much opposed to it. There was a lot of debate and discussion, and many meetings held between representatives of those two denominations. Some were very anxious to see them unite into one national church, instead of two.

The outcome was that in the late Twenties the union actually took place, and that was the birth of the United Church in Canada, which has been the largest Protestant denomination in Canada ever since.

When the union took place, most of the Methodist Churches (with very few exceptions) went into the union. The Presbyterian denomination was a little more divided. The majority of the churches went in, but there were quite a number of Presbyterian churches that refused to go along with the union. They remained out as Presbyterian Churches, but their overall national structure of course had been amalgamated with the new structure known as the United Church in Canada.

In 1939, the Presbyterian Church in Canada incorporated by an Act of Parliament, as the Presbyterian Church in Canada. That was made up of all these Presbyterian churches that had not gone into the union. Now they had a national incorporation. This legislation in the Province was simply providing Provincial legislation complementary to the national

incorporation. It provided the Trustee Boards and things of that kind to handle their common property. But it really grew out of that rather long process of the union, a group of churches remaining out of the union, they then incorporating nationally in 1939, and then in the various Provinces getting legislation that complemented that Federal incorporation.

LS: This isn't unusual in Provincial legislation, growing out of that situation?

ECM: No. This came as a result of a request to the Province from the Presbyterian Church in Canada. It wasn't something that was initiated by the Government. We were simply carrying out their request for complementary legislation to their Federal incorporation.

LS: There's one other piece of legislation that I hadn't referred to, and that's the Alberta Evidence Act. What were its provisions?

ECM: That was a very minor act in 1943. I think its most significant provision was for films to be acceptable as evidence in Court. This type of thing was just getting into the picture in those days, so to speak! Since that time, as you know, these things have progressed a long way. Now you have the question of whether you can have taped telephone conversations, videotapes, cassette tapes, or all kinds of electric evidence. This started out with filmstrips.

LS: The Edmonton Bulletin of February 27th, 1943, reported on a speech by Mr. Aberhart. In fact, perhaps because Mr. Aberhart didn't give a lot of speeches, they reported quite a lot of the text. It's an interesting speech in a number of ways. For one thing, he is addressing the criticism that the Social Credit Government had received for not instituting certain kinds of Social Credit legislation. He basically came back and said, "If the Prime Minister of the country had kept his promises in certain ways and not disallowed so much legislation, we would have been more successful with Social Credit legislation."

That is not what I'd like to discuss so much, but rather another thing that comes through that particular speech. Throughout the speech, he comments on change, the ravages of sickness and death among the Members of the House. I believe this was the time of the death of Mr. Duggan, who had been the Independent leader. He comments several times on the wisdom of the old and the inexperience of the young, in particular in reference to the new Leader of the Opposition, although he doesn't name him.

Do you know who that would have been?

ECM: It could have been Mr. Mahafee, he was Leader for a while. We referred to him before, the Calgary lawyer.

LS: A direct quote from the reporting of that speech was as follows (this was attributed to Mr. Aberhart): "I think the poet was right when he said, 'Change and decay in all around I see.' I should like you to note that, strange as it may seem, most of the change and decay in this Legislature is to be found on the Opposition side." Did he have a strong sense of humour, or was that unusual?

ECM: He had quite a sense of humour. It didn't show up, because, as you indicated, he rarely spoke in the House, but Mr. Aberhart had a delightful sense of humour when he wanted to use it.

LS: He goes on further in that speech to say, "Some of us older fellows know, however, that freedom is not secured by independence or retirement to a secluded cloister. True democratic freedom can only be secured in association with others."

The point that I'm trying to make here is that throughout this speech there's a lot of concern about youth and age, a lot of concern about change, and one perhaps projects (because one knows with hindsight that Mr. Aberhart was to die in May of that same year) that he seemed to be weary, and there was almost a foreshadowing of concern about these things. I would like to have your comments about these final months of Mr. Aberhart, and perhaps to discuss briefly some of the things that motivated

Mr. Aberhart, not on any particular issue, but over those 17 or 18 years of your close association with him.

ECM: Referring to the speech and the time that it was given, it was significant. The philosophy expressed in it was in no sense a new philosophy as far as Mr. Aberhart was concerned. But it was emphasized, as you pointed out.

I recall in that same context (I don't know just how the dates would relate to this particular speech in the Legislature) that he gave an address outside the Legislature. He had been active in discussing publicly the whole post-War reconstruction period and the problems that would arise. They had even put together some organizations that were dedicated to concentrating on the problems of that time, and he gave an address under the auspices of this group entitled "To Us the Torch is Thrown".

It was written up quite widely at the time, and it was very much along the line of what you referred to in this speech. It was tied in of course with the War effort and that the men sacrificing their lives there had thrown the torch to others. He made the application of it to society as a whole, one generation succeeding the other. Which again, in retrospect, would seem significant. It was almost as if he was saying, "I'm going to have to throw this torch to a younger generation before too long."

Again looking back, I'm quite sure that those of us who were close to him didn't realize that his health was deteriorating in the way that it was in that last Session. He ended that session utterly worn out, weary, which was not natural for Mr. Aberhart. He was a very strong, vigorous, robust man, with tremendous reserves of energy. But he had this ailment, which we didn't know about, and I don't think he knew either. It was some liver problem which was sapping his energy.

Immediately at the close of that Session, he went to Vancouver to recouperate, and he never came back.

I wouldn't even say that he was conscious of it, but I think it was

probably the impact on his thinking and his personality of his weariness which this illness was creating, and which was foreign to him. I'm sure it was annoying to him, because he was the type of man who would be very, very annoyed at feeling weary. He just didn't want to feel weary; there was too much to do.

But that speech in the Legislature, and the one that I referred to outside the House, were very similar in content, and both had that emphasis on the older generation passing.

LS: It was extraordinary to read it and see the date on it.

[short gap]

LS: I think I could answer what motivated Mr. Aberhart in some areas: his concern for young people and interest in education, for one, and his religious and spiritual strength. But I wonder if, as someone who knew him well, you knew of other things that were motivating him. It's an extraordinary history of a man.

ECM: I know it's commonly said that individuals are frequently motivated by one major factor, and I suppose that's true. My assessment of Mr. Aberhart would be that he was motivated by a combination of factors. You have mentioned some. He had a very, very deep sense of responsibility, and this grew from his Christian conviction that we were in this world to serve, that we are our brother's keeper, we have an obligation to others. His love of young people and his concern for what their future would be certainly was a big factor.

But in addition to those rather specific things, he was one of those individuals that's commonly referred to, for lack of a better term, by the very simply designation of "doer". He was always doing something. He wasn't a philosopher who wanted to sit down and read and read and read. He did a lot of reading, but he only read to acquire ammunition to go out and shoot at something that he wanted to do. He was a "doer" by nature, a very hard worker. He didn't have to drive himself to work. He loved to do what

he was doing. He was dedicated to what he was doing.

It seemed to me that it was really a combination of those things. Let me put it another way. It's very hard, of course, to say what a man would be like if he didn't have have some characteristic which was a very prominent characteristic of his life. But even if Mr. Aberhart had not been fond of young people, I can't imagine him not working in the interests of young people, because it was a field in which you did things that needed to be done.

I would hesitate to say what his manner of life would have been like without his Christian convictions, because they were part of the warp and woof of his life.

He was one of those people who never live by a clock. There was no such thing as hours and days of work. You did what needed to be done to the best of your ability, to the limit of your strength, because it was the thing you wanted to do and it needed to be done. And that showed up in every facet of his life.

He was that way in his teaching profession. I think I've mentioned before, when he was Principal of the Collegiate in Calgary, if he went away on a brief vacation he would be back a week or ten days early, back at the school, lining up all his timetables, schedules and plans. When the other teachers and the pupils came back, he'd been working for ten days getting all this stuff ready. He didn't have to, he wasn't required to do it, but that was his concept of doing a good job.

It was the same, when he was in the Legislature with all his responsibility as Premier and the struggle of those difficult days. He still maintained his weekly Christian broadcast ministry, went down to Calgary every week or second week for that, with never any question that he would do anything else. He was that type; he was a doer.

LS: You met him in your early 20's?

ECM: I met Mr. Aberhart first in 1926, when I was 18.

LS: Did you later learn anything of his childhood, what his parents were like? Did he ever talk about those things?

ECM: He used to make reference to his father, in his talks, not frequently but occasionally. I gathered, from the things he said, that his father was a very down-to-earth, realistic type of man. The things he used to refer to were simple lessons that he'd learned from his father. They were simple things that he used to quote, yet you could sense in it that his father must have made quite an impression on him.

I remember, for example, he used to talk about plowing a straight furrow. His father told him, "If you want to plow a straight furrow, you'll never do it by looking at the edge of the field on either side. There's only one way to plough a straight furrow, and that is get your eye on a point at the far end, and never take it off till you get there."- the idea of having a goal. He would use that as an illustration.

That type of simple little illustration. I never knew his people at all. He came West in 1912 or 1914, somewhere around there, from Ontario. He had been teaching in Brantford, and I knew nothing of his life down there, except the odd reference he'd make.

LS: When you came to Calgary, did you actually live in the Aberhart home?

ECM: I did at times. The first time I came to Calgary, I was only there for about four weeks, and I met Mr. Aberhart then. I came to meet him, as a result of listening to his broadcasts.

Then when I came back to Calgary in the fall of 1927, when he opened the Bible College and I enrolled and attended, if I recall correctly, I lived with the Aberharts (boarded at their home) for part of that winter. The following winter I was in another place. Then in 1930, the year I graduated, he asked me to stay on, on the staff of the institute, and to help him with the radio work. And I stayed at their home for quite a

period that time, in fact I was still at their home in 1935, when we went into Government.

The first time I went there, they were going away for a brief holiday in the summer, to the Coast, and I remember them asking if I would go and stay at the house, just to have somebody around. Then I stayed on and boarded there, which was a very pleasant experience for me. We used to sit up in the study and talk about things till the small hours of the morning, often.

LS: What was Mrs. Aberhart like?

ECM: Mrs. Aberhart was a very capable woman. I suppose you would describe her in some respects as almost a regal type of a woman, intelligent, a very attractive woman. She was very supportive of him, but she liked to stay in the background. She wasn't the kind that wanted to be on a public platform or make speeches, except when she was cornered at a dinner, or presented and had to say a few words. She was a tower of strength and support for him. She was active in Christian work with him. She used to be Superintendent of the Primary Department of a Sunday School in Calgary for years. She also worked with the Y.W.C.A. in Calgary, very actively, for a number of years.

LS: I'm sure you've read references, and know of references, where people have described your relationship to Mr. Aberhart as your being a disciple of his or a "right-hand man" of his, almost like a son of his. I'm interested in that, and also, what are the things that you still carry with you today, that you learned from those early times with the Aberhart family and particularly with Mr. Aberhart.

ECM: It was a very fortunate experience for me. I came to Calgary from a farm, with a rural background. I'd never been involved in anything in an urban centre in my life. I was not accustomed to close association with people, in the sense of crowds, audiences, and things of that kind. I never had experience of that kind at all.

I've always felt I was extremely fortunate to have the opportunity of that

close association with Mr. Aberhart, in the first place because it gave me a source of advice and counsel on anything that I wanted. I was a beneficiary of his fondness for young people. This was really quite consistent with what we've been talking about - his interest in young people.

He had no reason to take an interest in me. I was a total stranger to him; I knew him only through his radio work, which of course was a tie. That's one thing that Christian radio work does - you do feel a tie with those whose lives are touched by those things. It was with him (through my assocation with him) that I became integrated into what you might call the urban form of life and dealing with people. Right from the start, my associations with him were in his work at the institute with audiences, and then with radio. You were always dealing with people, which was a whole new field to me.

I sat under his instruction during the years in Bible college; he taught quite a number of classes himself and was a fantastic teacher. I benefited tremendously in Biblical knowledge that I acquired under his instruction in college days. And then when I went on with him as assistant in the radio work, of course it gave me the inside position on all the activities of the radio ministry. As he moved from that into the interest in economics, I was there from Day One.

We used to sit up in the study, as I say, and talk about the Social Credit idea. He was telling me about his experience with his friend in Edmonton who got him interested in reading Maurice Colbourne's books. It was just a matter of complete involvement in it from the beginning.

As far as the public perception of all this, all these various things that have been said about my association with him are quite understandable. I lived at his home. I was with him when he went on his lecture tours around the Province. I always went with him, drove the car for him, gave the warm-up speech at all the meetings, looked after all the management end of things, and so we were always together.

I've been told, and looking back and realizing now more than then how a young person is influenced by association with an older person, I picked up many of his mannerisms. I always found it rather amusing, I used to take radio services for him when he'd be away on vacation or something, and the radio people would say they couldn't tell our voices apart. I took public speaking under him, so the methods of homiletics that he used were the same that I used because I had attended his classes on homiletics. Unconsciously, you emulate mannerisms and manners of speaking, and things of that kind.

I think I'm quite truthful in saying that our personalities were fundamentally different; we were different types of people altogether. But in the public eye, I reflected a great deal of what they were accustomed to from him.

Again, when we got into the political stuff, in the educational work before it became political, the fact of this close association is the kind of thing that feeds on itself. For example, if he was asked to give a talk somewhere (a Social Credit talk) and for some reason he couldn't go, they would always say, "Well, can Manning go?"

In fact, I remember one week (and I have very good reason to remember this) in about 1934, when we were doing Provincial tours during the summer holidays - two meetings a day, five days a week, one afternoon and one evening meeting. Of course, in the Depression years you could have just as big a crowd in the afternoon as at night because nobody was working anyway. They had nothing to do but go to meetings.

We had these itineraries lined up weeks ahead, and all the publicity. We'd go back into Calgary for the weekend because he had the broadcast work and other things to attend to. We'd head out, usually Sunday night (we usually drove at night in the hot weather because there was no air conditioning in cars in those days). And that was in the drought years when the southern part of the country was infested with grasshoppers, which made travel a little bit awkward when there was no air conditioning. You had to keep your car windows up, otherwise the car would be full of grasshoppers. So

you smothered to death! So we used to drive at night, to wherever we were having a meeting at noon the next day.

Anyway, this particular week I had gone up to Red Deer. We had a number of branch churches that we took care of from the college; students would go out and take weekend services. We had six or eight of these around southern Alberta, and we developed one at Innisfail and one at Red Deer where I had sort of taken over the supervision. We had come into Calgary on Friday night, and worked at the office on Saturday, and I drove up to Red Deer on Saturday night. We were to leave again Monday morning for this tour because I had to go back to Red Deer that night.

I got a call from Mr. Aberhart on Sunday afternoon, and he could hardly talk. He'd developed laryngitis - one of the few times I ever remember him having it. So he said, "I just can't take these talks; I haven't got enough voice. You'll have to go out and take the series. We can't do anything about it; they're all advertised." So I said, "Well, if there's no alternative, I guess we'd better try it."

I picked up a young lad in Red Deer to go along with me for company, and I didn't even go back to Calgary. We just headed out from there. I remember that week the meetings were in Hanna, Youngstown, and all through that country. Of course these things had been billed for weeks, and people had come in for 100 miles to see this man Aberhart that they'd been listening to on the radio.

I'll never forget that week. The hall would be jam-packed with people - sometimes they were curling rinks because they couldn't get them in the ordinary halls. The chairman would get up and say, "Friends, I'm terribly sorry Mr. Aberhart is unable to be with us," and you could hear a sigh that would just about blow you off the platform. Then you were supposed to get up and give a speech after this!

I had been travelling with him so long, I could have given his speech word for word if I wanted to anyway; I wouldn't have had to use my own. So we got through the week, until Friday night we ended up in Castor. Our

meeting was in a curling rink, and by this time my voice was going! I was used to talking, but I'd been doing so much of it, and of course there were no public address systems in those days. You just had to make yourself heard. When you get into a curling rink and your crowd's 120 feet away, you'd be talking at the top of your voice. My voice was getting pretty badly gone, and about 2/3 of the way through, on this night in Castor, a hailstorm came up. It just poured down, and you couldn't hear yourself think in the rink. So that was the note on which the last meeting ended!

Fortunately, we were pretty well on to the end, so we just called it quits. Nobody could hear anything.

LS: Did you ever have any serious disagreements with Mr. Aberhart?

ECM: No, I can't say that I did. There were minor things that we wouldn't see eye to eye on, but never any disagreements. Mr. Aberhart (and this comes through in all the biographical material that's been written about him) wasn't an easy man to work with or for. He was impatient, demanding. I felt I knew him pretty well, and I didn't let this bother me. Sometimes it would rile you a little bit, but that was his nature. You recognized if you were going to work with this man, these were his characteristics. And I suppose there were things about me that irritated him, I'm quite sure there were.

LS: But no major disagreements?

ECM: No, we never had any major disagreements.

LS: At the Easter break, when Mr. and Mrs. Aberhart went to Vancouver, do you recall the day that you received the notice that he had died?

ECM: He went to Vancouver. Mrs. Aberhart was quite worried about the condition of his health. He wouldn't acknowledge anything, and he never said anything publicly about not feeling well. He would come out of a long session or night sitting, and say, "Oh boy, I feel tired," which those of us who were close to him would notice. That was not characteristic of

him. They lived at the Macdonald Hotel, and I remember talking with Mrs. Aberhart one time just before that Session ended, and saying something about how Mr. Aberhart was awfully tired. And I remember her saying, "Yes he is, and I'm concerned about it. I wish, if you have an opportunity, and any of the other fellows, that you'd urge him to get away for a break as soon as the House ends." He was more apt to stay around for six weeks to clean things up. So we did. I remember saying to him, "You should get away and get a rest," and I'm sure some of the other men did the same. And this time he was quite willing to go; I'm sure he felt far more drained than he was admitting publicly.

He went out to the Coast, and, as I recall from what was said about it afterward, by the time he got there he was completely exhausted. Of course you went by train in those days. They took him to hospital. His older daughter, who lived at the Coast, was a nurse. He was in the hospital for about a week, and he rallied, seemed to come around, and went home to their place in Vancouver. He was having a rest.

I guess he was home ten days or two weeks, and began getting weaker and weaker again. His daughter of course was concerned about this, and felt there was something seriously wrong. They took him back to the hospital, and he rallied a bit. Even at that time, it wasn't regarded as terminal or anything like that. Then finally, he started going downhill.

I was in touch with him; I was Acting Premier so I'd keep in touch with anything that was going on. I'd talk to him on the phone on things I wanted to clear with him before we acted on them here. And finally they told us that the doctors had said, "This is serious. He's just not responding." There was nothing we could do about it; we kept in touch daily then. And finally they told us, "He's sinking, there's no question about it, so you'd better come out."

Mr. Fallow and I, and our wives, got on the train to Vancouver. We got in there on a Sunday morning, and his son-in-law met us at the station. He said he had died the night before.

It was a very disturbing, sad time. When he had gone, those of us who knew him well knew he was tired, worn out, but that was understandable. He'd been driving himself very hard, and he was 64. He wasn't old, but on the other hand he was at an age where perpetual work might start to tell. But nobody had any inkling that there was anything really serious about it; we just thought he was overworked and needed a rest.

LS: Your sense of loss must have been great.

ECM: It was. I think I can truthfully say that of all the people working with him in the Government, I had had the longest and closest personal relationship with him, having lived in his home for five years and worked with him in Christian work and the broadcast and college work. In all the educational work, we always travelled together. Actually, in many respects, I wasn't as close in contact with him after he became Premier as I was in those days. In those days we were together all the time. Once I had my own departments to look after, and he had the Premiership, I would probably only see him at Cabinet meetings and occasional times otherwise. But we were very close.

LS: Did you ever play chess with him?

ECM: Oh yes. In fact, this is a secret I shouldn't divulge, but I was the one that started Mr. Aberhart playing chess.

LS: You had a large responsibility!

ECM: I learned to play chess in a very unique way. I don't think I mentioned this in any place earlier. Years and years ago, when I was a lad at public school in Saskatchewan, my older brother and I were both at school. In the old one-room school they had an encyclopedia called Everyman's Encyclopedia, 12 volumes, and it had a section in it on chess. My older brother, who was a great student, got hold of this thing and got intrigued with the description of how to play chess. We were just kids on the farm. So we made ourselves a set of chessmen - just from any old objects that we could pare off. We couldn't afford to buy chess sets in those days.

We used to lie in front of the old heater in our farm home with the little encyclopedia, and figured out how to play chess!

I think Mr. Aberhart probably had played before, but he hadn't for years. I remember saying one day, "How about some chess?" He got very enthused about chess, and became quite a good player - a better player than I was.

LS: In the Provincial Archives there are his notes on chess moves. They're incredible - in great detail.

ECM: He was very fond of chess. It was a challenging kind of thing, which he liked. It was mentally stimulating. Chess has been used for so many things. The technology and philosophy of chess has been used to solve mysteries - that's why the famous detectives play chess.

LS: I think we'll leave it there for today. Thank you.